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Abstract  
Cybersecurity risk is dynamic and rapidly evolving. Today, cyber incidents can significantly 
impair government operations, erode public confidence, undermine operations of critical 
infrastructures, and put citizen data and whole industries at risk. Managing these risks to cyber 
assets must be part of a state’s overall risk management portfolio. To do this successfully, state 
leaders must have effective cybersecurity governance. To achieve this, governors and state 
legislatures must ensure that their states have the essential governance mechanisms necessary for 
understanding and managing cybersecurity risk and for translating awareness about cyber threats 
into action. This dissertation gives an overview of three different governance models 
(centralized, decentralized, and hybrid), comparing effectiveness of each by state. Most literature 
suggests that a centralized cybersecurity governance approach, where one organization is 
designated and has authority to make all of the decisions about cybersecurity and IT security, is 
the most effective at the state level. However, this is not always feasible due to budget 
constraints, lack of trained personnel, and state culture. Comparing Nationwide Cybersecurity 
Review (NCSR) governance data and answers from cybersecurity governance interviews with 
individuals responsible for cybersecurity in their respective states, this study tests the hypothesis 
that states with centralized authority over cybersecurity governance will have higher NCSR 
scores (higher scores = more successful cybersecurity programs) than states that utilize a 
decentralized or hybrid model. While initial data supports the hypothesis, it also suggests that a 
hybrid cybersecurity governance model (encompassing a mixture of centralized and 
decentralized) could be the answer for states struggling to become centralized. 
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Chapter 1: Cybersecurity Governance 
Introduction: The Threats 
On June 5, 2019, two Maryland state databases were infiltrated by hackers who were able 
to access the names and Social Security numbers of 78,000 people (Seculore Solutions, 2019). 
Maryland officials reported that the state responded to the incident by providing two years of 
free credit monitoring to people whose information was made vulnerable by the attack. New 
Jersey education and state government officials had their email addresses made publicly 
available on various PasteBin – text storage sites – posts in March of 2018 (Seculore Solutions, 
2019). Emails are now exposed to a variety of phishing scams and social engineering tactics. 
Affected officials were told to be on the lookout for these types of scams and viruses to begin 
appearing on these email accounts. Steps have also been taken to secure and change the 
passwords associated with the leaked accounts. In Texas, on October 26, 2017, a Texas 
Department of Agriculture government employee’s state issued laptop was compromised through 
a malicious ransomware attack. Roughly 700 total students in almost 40 school districts had their 
private information compromised and accessed by the attacker. This information included 
names, Social Security numbers, home addresses, dates of birth, and personal phone numbers 
(Seculore Solutions, 2019). The Texas Department of Agriculture took immediate action to 
fortify and routinely monitor the vulnerabilities within their computer system. Two Iranian 
hackers utilized the SamSam ransomware to take over the Atlanta municipal computer system 
and demanded a payment to restore it in March of 2018. Atlanta’s city computers were crippled 
for more than a week due to an immense amount of vulnerabilities in the system, and eventually 
were forced to shut down the system completely. Over six million people were affected by the 
breach, and roughly a third of city software programs were either disabled or knocked out 
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completely. The city ultimately paid roughly $9.5 million in recovery efforts, and city residents 
temporarily had to revert to a paper system while the computers were shut down (Seculore 
Solutions, 2019). Richmond, Virginia’s computer system was attacked by the same SamSam 
ransomware that crippled Atlanta just weeks before in April of 2018. This attack was mitigated 
by Richmond’s information technology (IT) team, which utilized the city’s strong backup system 
to enable the system to quickly recover. No external contractors were called, and financial losses 
were minimized (Seculore Solutions, 2019).  
 Cyber threats are evolving, and the risks are increasing (Pardo, Gass, Garcia, Pylant, De 
Vallance, and Cooke, 2020, p. 2). Management by silo is the current culture of management. 
Visibility into underlying business and technology processes has become an antiquated approach 
to understanding and controlling a government environment. Having centralized authority and 
decentralized control over cybersecurity has allowed the field in its current state to be uncertain 
in regard to the upper legislature in government. Previous models used in other highly successful 
practices to include human resources, finance, and legal are not quite the right fit for current 
information technology and cybersecurity enabled agencies (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 3). More 
importantly, they are not even close enough to make a difference at the cybersecurity level. 
Basically, this means that models have to be created and implemented with cybersecurity in 
mind. This includes governance models that cybersecurity professionals must follow.  
Governance 
These governance structures that are required should be holistic, and they should provide 
for an overall approach to governing cybersecurity. At the highest level of state government (the 
governor’s office), there are certain requirements that a governance program must follow. 
Leadership is especially important, as is vision; both should be communicated through a 
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hierarchy. There should be ample training and development of the actual “need” for governance 
across all levels of state government (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 8). This training and development 
should come from the top down. The siloed approach of collaboration has not proven to be 
beneficial, nor has it provided the required results. This is especially true given the need for 
cybersecurity professionals to react and respond at more granular levels within all state level 
agencies. Cost – not only financial – but the cost of adhering to the governance framework, 
needs to be justified; there needs to be “buy-in” across all levels of state government. Risk 
should also be calculated and controlled at all times. The decisions being made should be based 
on an analysis of risk and then aligned to providing information across organizations. This helps 
to categorize, analyze, and understand the risks that each level faces. If a complete appreciation 
of risk across government is not known, then the cost of adherence is not being attributed 
correctly. Risks in cybersecurity are constantly changing; the decision-makers must react and 
provide the collaborative assistance to understand the need (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 9). They must 
also be able and ready to respond in kind. If the understanding of these needs across state 
government is applied correctly, the underlying governance framework (centralized/unified, 
decentralized/federated, hybrid) will build upon itself.  
“Cybersecurity governance is the process through which humans understand 
organizational risk, prioritize resources, and establish procedures to erect technical defenses 
against computer-based attacks,” (Garcia, Forscey, and Blute, 2017, p. 254). It is further defined 
as “the processes by which decisions are made about cybersecurity risk, and effective programs 
that manage that risk to a degree that is acceptable to the governor and legislature,” (Pardo, et al., 
2020, p. 4). States are responsible for protecting their constituents and for preparing public and 
private institutions for a widespread cyber disruption. Cybersecurity governance success requires 
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a whole-of-state approach that arranges all relevant stakeholders, assigns responsibilities, and 
then allocates resources. There is an overlapping of responsibilities between cybersecurity 
governance and IT governance. 
Cybersecurity Governance Study Overview 
This dissertation will look at some of the overlapping responsibilities between IT and 
cybersecurity governance and seek to answer the research question: Is a centralized cybersecurity 
governance model the most successful (effective and efficient) framework and can this 
model/framework be successfully implemented at the state level? This particular question is 
important with the rise of recent cyber threats against states and state-level agencies, and a lack 
of grounded cybersecurity governance to thwart such attacks. Threats to cybersecurity are an 
ever-present and fundamental organizational risk; managing risks to cyber assets must be part of 
a state’s overall risk management portfolio (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 3). To do this effectively, state 
leaders must have effective cybersecurity governance. The essential governance mechanisms in 
the form of frameworks and models is necessary for understanding and managing cybersecurity 
risk; it is also important for translating awareness about cyber threats into action. This effort 
demands appropriate resources, including but not limited to, fiscal and human capital on a 
continuous basis.  
The research will look at Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) data at the state 
level, and test the hypothesis that states with centralized authority over cybersecurity governance 
will have higher NCSR scores (higher scores = more successful cybersecurity programs) than 
states that utilize a decentralized or hybrid model. The NCSR score is based on the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework’s (CSF’s) five 
functions – identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover – as they relate to cybersecurity 
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governance. The five functions are representative of the five “must haves” for a successful and 
holistic cybersecurity program (NIST, 2018). In regard to cybersecurity governance at the state 
and state agency level, the five functions help leaders explain the management of their 
cybersecurity programs, the risks associated with their cybersecurity programs at high levels, and 
help with the risk decision-making process. In essence, the assessment of these functions is the 
governance model. A good governance model that is implemented and supported could mean the 
difference between a successful or thwarted attack (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 5). 
Additionally, the study compares NCSR governance data and data collected through 12 
telephone interviews with individuals responsible in some way for cybersecurity in their state. 
Interviewees included Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), Cyber Operations Officers, 
Chief Risk Officers, Chief Security Officers, and Chief Information Officers (CIOs). The 
interviews were performed by myself and colleagues at the Center for Internet Security in East 
Greenbush, New York. All members of the project team participated in the interviews. The 
purpose of the interviews was to aid in the development of a guidance document and checklist 
for governors and state legislatures to use in creating and strengthening their cybersecurity 
governance.  
This study used the analysis of NCSR governance data. High NCSR scores (on a one to 
seven-point Likert scale) represent more successful cybersecurity programs; this is according to 
the Review’s sponsors, the Department of Homeland Security and the Multi-State Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (part of the Center for Internet Security). Forty-three states 
participated in the NCSR, and for the most part, states that utilized centralized authority over 
their cybersecurity governance did have higher scores than those that followed a decentralized or 
hybrid model of governance (MS-ISAC, 2018). However, there were some exceptions and 
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instances where a hybrid model was more effective for some states. The answers received during 
the 12 interviews were compared with the data from the NCSR; findings suggest that while most 
states would like to utilize a centralized approach to cybersecurity governance, it is not always 
possible. States that are centralized in respect to cybersecurity governance, are seeking out ways 
to improve their programs; they are taking heed from other state’s centralized governance 
programs and even learning from decentralized and hybrid models of governance. Cybersecurity 
governance is not one-size fits all; it is often dependent upon a state’s resources, culture, 
demographics, and politics. It is also dependent on the state’s needs and associated cybersecurity 
risks. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction: Collaboration 
The global cost of cyber-attacks is an estimated US$80-400 billion annually (Lewis and 
Baker, 2013, p. 5). Cyber threats are one of, if not the most, effective ways to attack an 
organization. Phishing, cloning, identity theft, and password thefts are widely used methods of 
maliciously compromising an organization. Add to that the human threat of negligent, careless, 
or simply uninformed employees, and cybersecurity and cyber defense are critical for 
safeguarding an organization's information and processes. Experian’s Managing Insider Risk 
through Training and Culture Report found that 66 percent of the data protection and privacy 
training professionals surveyed labeled their employees as the “weakest link,” (Miller, 2018). 
Clicking on links, opening unknown attachments, and entering personal or confidential 
information into a seemingly friendly (and familiar) account are hindering factors against 
safeguarding their organization from cyber threats (Miller, 2018). The levels and types of threats 
are ever-changing because of technological development. Cyber-espionage, for example, is 
rampant in the public sector; state-affiliated actors account for 79 percent of all breaches 
involving external actors (Verizon, 2019). Privilege misuse and error by insiders account for 30 
percent of breaches, with actor motives being espionage (66%), financial (29%), and other (2%) 
breaches (Verizon, 2019). Research has shown that the only way to get a handle on existing and 
future threats is through collaborative defense. Specifically, at the state level, a governance 
framework consisting of a set of information technology (IT) and cybersecurity governance 
models is needed.  
Collaborative efforts are only as good as the leaders that oversee them. In the cyber 
defense schema, collaboration can be difficult as there are many different governing bodies with 
various potential barriers to overcome. The Center for Internet Security, Inc. (CIS), in 
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collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), aims to safeguard private and 
public state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) organizations against cyber threats. The 
501(c)(3) nonprofit organization is responsible for identifying, developing, validating, 
promoting, and sustaining best practice solutions for cyber defense to help people, businesses, 
and governments protect themselves from pervasive cyber-attacks (CIS, 2019). CIS runs the 
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), which is the ultimate resource 
for cyber threat prevention, protection, response, and recovery for U.S. SLTT entities. They also 
house the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), which 
supports the cybersecurity needs of U.S. State, Local, and Territorial elections offices. CIS is 
only one part of the picture in this defense; there are many other pieces to the puzzle that aim to 
make the internet and the cyber world safe and secure. Cyber threats can affect everyone in some 
form or fashion. While there are collaborative efforts going on to prevent and halt cyber-attacks, 
there are also collaborative efforts taking place amongst the hackers themselves. 
In order to effectively and efficiently handle the on-going real-world cyber threats, 
collaboration is key, and can be done so through collaborative governance regimes (CGRs). 
CGRs are very diverse and can range from intergovernmental and interstate arrangements, 
interagency work, and government to public service contracting, public-private partnerships, etc. 
Under the umbrella of collaborative governance are government agencies, nonprofits, 
government agencies as government contractors, and for profits as government contractors. The 
everyday citizen also falls under this umbrella.  
Collaborative governance is on the rise. Emerson and Nabatchi credit the rise to wicked 
problems; these are problems that seem impossible to solve because of changing environments 
and their complexity (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 8). There are many reasons why cyber 
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defense and cybersecurity are wicked problems. The issue is complex and can happen without 
any warning. Identifying system context, drivers, and regime formation for this issue can be 
difficult. The drivers for initiating collaborative governance in this respect are those of 
uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentivism, and initiating leadership. 
Leadership is key in the success and/or failure of such initiatives; it is equally important 
that all parties involved are working towards one common goal. Most collaborative governance 
occurs when there is a problem that needs to be solved within the context of alternative dispute 
resolution. In a cyber defense schema, that problem involves thwarting attacks, protecting the 
organization or entity from cyber-attacks, and preventing future attacks. The leakage by Edward 
Snowden of information regarding U.S. government surveillance programs, the Mandiant report 
which disclosed the existence of China spying on the U.S., and Russia’s involvement in the 2016 
presidential election are all significant realisms that cyber threats are happening without us even 
knowing. Many governments are attempting to exert sovereignty in cyberspace the same way 
they do in physical domains, yet they are struggling to keep up with the pace of technological 
advances. The internet environment is becoming more international, and less western-centric 
(Nocetti, 2015, p. 111). However, it is mostly U.S.-centric when it comes to cyber policy. 
On May 2, 2019, President Donald Trump’s administration issued an executive order on 
America’s Cybersecurity Workforce as a set of plans and provisions to grow and strengthen the 
nation’s cybersecurity workforce. According to the executive order, “America’s cybersecurity 
workforce is a strategic asset that protects the American people, the homeland, and the American 
way of life. The National Cyber Strategy, the President’s 2018 Management Agenda, and 
Executive Order 13800 of May 11, 2017 (Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks 
and Critical Infrastructure), each emphasize that a superior workforce will promote American 
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prosperity and preserve peace,” (Trump, 2019). The executive order aims to enhance workforce 
mobility between the public and private sectors, establish a cybersecurity rotational assignment 
program, support the development of cybersecurity skills to maintain a competitive edge in 
cybersecurity, and continue to hold heads of executive departments and agencies accountable for 
managing cybersecurity risk to their enterprises (Trump, 2019). Along with those provisions, the 
order on America’s Cybersecurity Workforce will focus on job training and recognition 
programs designed to identify and reward current federal employees that have the potential to 
acquire cybersecurity skills. 
Literature  
The field of cyber defense and cybersecurity is constantly changing, and so are the 
threats. When examining an organization’s stance on cybersecurity, it is common to consider 
mitigated and accepted risks. It is impossible to stop all cyber threats, and perfect cybersecurity 
is not possible (Garcia, Gilligan, and Calkin, 2018, p. 6). Instead, organizations seek to achieve 
“reasonable” security; they accept some level of risk and consequences and have a recovery plan 
if said consequences occur.  
Large-scale cyber-attacks are referred to as cyber acts of war, although there is no 
consensus regarding what constitutes cyberwarfare. Almeida (2017) identifies critical 
infrastructure sectors as power, water, transportation, and communication systems that are 
vulnerable to cyber threats and attacks. These types of attacks would affect more than just 
cyberspace; they could have a lasting impact on the physical world. Malicious code such as 
viruses, Trojans, rootkits, worms, bots, and spyware can be engaged at any time. Weaponized 
zero days – a computer-software vulnerability that is unknown to, or unaddressed by, those who 
should be interested in mitigating the vulnerability – can be deployed not only to perpetrate 
common cybercrime, but also to engage in cyberwarfare (Almeida, Doneda, and de Souza 
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Abreu, 2017, p. 2). Until the vulnerability is mitigated, hackers can exploit it to adversely affect 
computer programs, data, additional computers, or a network. Robert Clarke and Robert Knake 
define cyberwarfare as “actions an identified nation-state uses to penetrate another nation’s 
computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption,” (Clark and Knake, 
2010, p. 6). In this two-state definition, one nation is the source and the other the target. 
Contradicting the Clark and Knake definition is Stuxnet, a computer worm developed to 
sabotage Iran’s nuclear facilities. The source of the worm is not clear, though it is speculated to 
have ties to the U.S. and Israel. A cyber operation can end up being addressed by criminal law as 
a cybercrime, or by war and international humanitarian law as an “act of war,” (Almeida, et al., 
2017, pp. 2-3). 
Cyberwarfare involves actions that achieve political or military effect; it often involves 
the use of cyberspace to deliver direct or cascading kinetic effects, and create results that either 
cause or are a crucial component of a serious threat to a nation’s security or that are conducted in 
response to such a threat (Almeida, et al., 2017, p. 3). Cyberspace conflicts involve state and 
non-state actors on both sides of a conflict to include companies, hackers, individuals, and 
groups. The 2016 U.S. presidential election and the cyberspace episodes associated are an 
example of cyberwarfare and the evolution of such. In February of 2018, a federal grand jury 
indicted 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities on charges connected with the 2016 U.S. 
elections (Department of Justice, 2018). Charges included conspiracy to defraud the United 
States, conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, and fraud with identification documents. 
National Security Correspondent, David Sanger stated that “the attempt of a foreign power to 
disrupt the 2016 presidential election is a clear sign of cyber espionage and information-warfare 
actions that have been viewed by some analysts as an act of war,” (Almeida, et al., 2017, p. 3).  
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These incidences raise questions as to how exactly a country can defend its interests in 
cyberspace, and how they can do so collaboratively with internet governance bodies. Initiatives 
can be broken down into a few broad categories: cyber defense, cyber deterrence, 
cyberpreemption, and cyber arms control. Cyber deterrence aims at dissuading adversaries; 
however, because there is often a difficult time to attribute a cyber-attack, it is not a completely 
effective strategy (Nye, 2017). Cyberpreemption refers to reducing the capability of the potential 
forces of an adversary. A New York Times editorial stated that the best way to reduce cyber risks 
is “to accelerate international efforts to negotiate limits on the cyber arms race, akin to the arms-
control treaties of the Cold War” (Almeida, et al., 2017, p. 4). Through an international 
framework, cyberspace governance bodies can minimize global cyber threats. 
Cyberspace architecture can be broken down into four layers. The bottom layer is the 
actual players and people who take part in cyberspace; the second layer is the information stored 
in cyberspace; the third layer is made up of the logical building blocks of the services and 
platforms; and the top layer is the physical layer which includes the devices and communication 
networks. Citizens, government, and private businesses actively participate in all of the layers, 
though their roles and levels of participation may vary. National governance bodies 
(stakeholders) participate in cyber defense strategies by including cyberwarfare as an agenda 
topic, improving communication among state and non-state actors, promoting the discussion of 
cyber norms, and proposing cyber “hygiene” initiatives to protect against cyber threats (Almeida, 
et al., 2017, p. 4). These governance regimes can help build alliances between stakeholders, the 
military, the intelligence community, and society to minimize risks of cyber conflicts.  
Cybersecurity and elections are intertwined, and to enable the election process, security 
and reliability of elections infrastructure is a growing concern. U.S. based nonprofit, Center for 
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Internet Security (CIS), through a best practices approach, aims to help organizations involved in 
elections better understand what to focus on with cybersecurity and elections. They offer 
guidance to protect information technology systems, and address common threats to this critical 
aspect of democracy (Garcia, et al., 2018, p. 2). CIS created a handbook which includes 
strategies on how to protect the voting process as part of a national response to threats against 
elections infrastructure. The handbook addresses baseline assessments of elections and top-level 
assessment of risks, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences; it also provides the reader with 
examples of threats and consequences. There are many levels of election infrastructure to include 
voter registration, poll books, elections management systems (at the state and local level), vote 
capture devices, vote tabulation, and election results publishing (Garcia, et al., 2018, p.15). 
Threats and vulnerabilities of electronic vote management can include internet connectivity, 
network connections with other internal systems, security weaknesses in hardware and software, 
errors in managing authentication, difficulty finding and rolling back improper changes detected, 
and infrastructure and process-related issues with backup and auditing (Garcia, et al., 2018, p. 
15). The consequences of a successful attack in a vote capture and vote tabulation device are 
significant and could alter the outcome of an election. 
Breaches 
 The Verizon Threat Research Advisory Center (VTRAC) – Verizon’s threat intelligence 
platform – released the 12th installation of the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report 
(DBIR). The DBIR focuses on breaches – an incident that results in the confirmed disclosure of 
data to an unauthorized party. The report analyzed data breach trends affecting a variety of 
sectors, including public administration, healthcare, and education. Some of the key findings in 
the 2019 report are: 
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• 52% of breaches featured direct cyber threat actor interaction  
• 28% of breaches were caused by malware 
• 15% of breaches were due to misuse of access and authorities by authorized users 
• 69% of attacks were from external sources, 34% were caused by internal actors 
• 39% of attacks were assessed to be directly linked to organized criminal actors 
• 23% of all breaches were carried out by nation states (Verizon, 2019). 
Four collaborative efforts of cyber defense aim to improve cyber defense information 
sharing. These efforts focus on incentives and barriers and types of shareable information, 
collaborative risk management, intergovernmental collaborative challenges dealing with 
procedural models, and automation of cyber defense data. Information and communication 
technologies shared across economies and societies of developed countries pose a high-level and 
extensive threat to cybersecurity and cyber defense. Protecting these technologies requires 
immense collaboration through governance because they are shared world-wide (Vázquez, 
Acosta, Spirito, Brown, and Reid, 2012, p. 430).  
Standards 
There is a long-standing history throughout the cyber defense community of establishing 
and publishing standards for data sharing. This includes creating data-exchange and information 
sharing repository standards. Research is continuous, and there is debate in the field regarding 
what “data types are useful to share, organizational and national policies about what can be 
shared, models for sharing, and how-to best address privacy and security,” (Vázquez, et al., 
2012, p. 431). Coinciding with the debates, understanding what information-sharing networks 
are needed, who is participating, what information is desired and/or restricted, privileges, 
incentives, and establishing trust within the field fall under incentives and barriers in an 
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information sharing community. Engineers often focus on technical aspects of information 
sharing networks; they do not take into consideration the social, organizational, and cultural 
systems of use, or the governance models that need to be implemented in order to protect and 
assess them. This is a huge barrier. 
Information is shared according to “its perceived value, purpose, and meaning (Vázquez, 
et al., p. 433). It is important that the collaborative parties have mutual orientation towards an 
object, a common understanding of the information to be shared, and an understanding of the 
potential risks involved. Perception, interpretation, and conventions or instructed actions, must 
be the same for members of the collaborative project. Vázquez and colleagues claim that 
traditional risk management methodology consists of two phases: risk assessment and 
identification of assets, threats, and countermeasures, and risk management which considers the 
risk assessment in the decision-making process (Vázquez, et al., 2012, p. 434). These are all 
important components of a good cybersecurity governance model. 
Procedural Models 
Procedural models and information exchange models address individual needs of 
participants, allowing collaboration amongst partners. In a cyber defense sharing network, 
procedural models address roles, governance structure, funding, enabling collaboration, 
information protection and release control, and financial incentive models (Vázquez, et al., 2012, 
pp. 435-436). Models are very beneficial as they assign roles and identify the reasoning behind 
the collaboration. Models structure meetings and set rules and guidelines; they also address the 
information sharing relationships between the collaborative governance regime (CGR) members. 
A European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) paper that used the 
Milward and Provan model on collaboration networks showed that all networks use three 
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constructs; they are run by one from within, run by a coordinating entity, and are democratically 
peer led (ENISA, 2011, p. 28). Information sharing networks require a defined collaborative 
process. Details of the sharing relationships can vary depending on the type and sensitivity of 
information that is being shared. Data could include vulnerability information, threats, software, 
hardware, malware, security configurations, weakness information, etc.  
From a different perspective, the multi-stakeholder model of global internet governance 
has emerged to navigate the complex set of interests, agendas, and implications of the public’s 
dependence on global computer networks and technology (Carr, 2015, p. 1). All computer 
networks require some level of administration; and, multi-stakeholder organizations have 
become synonymous with global internet governance. Carr argues that multi-stakeholder internet 
governance serves largely to reinforce existing power relations rather than disrupt them, and that 
in itself, privileges the interests of the actors that established it (primarily the U.S. government) 
(Carr, 2015, p. 2). The diverse nature is its strength, offering the internet resiliency, stability, and 
adaptability. However, a broader cross section of private sector actors needs to be involved and 
empowered in the process.  
IT Governance 
Internet governance is a global political concern. “Twenty-first century economic and 
social structures are dependent on internet infrastructure for basic functioning,” (DeNardis and 
Raymond, 2013, p. 1). Both are constantly changing and evolving. Cybersecurity governance 
includes securing network infrastructure, designing encryption standards, cybersecurity 
regulation/enforcement, correcting software security vulnerabilities, software patch management, 
securing routing, addressing and Domain Name System (DNS), responding to security problems, 
and trust intermediaries authenticating websites. Primary institutional actors include Internet 
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Service Providers (ISPs), network operators, private end-users, standards-setting organizations, 
national statutes/multilateral agreements, software companies, Internet Engineering Task Forces 
(IETFs), registries, computer emergency response teams/computer security incident response 
teams (CERTs/CSIRTs), and certificate authorities (DeNardis and Raymond, 2013, p. 5).  
Internet governance is not a singular enterprise; there are many different layers. There are 
many possible types of multi-stakeholder governance regimes dependent on the types of actors 
involved and the nature of authority relations between the actors. Actors are states, formal 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and firms, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil 
society groups or movements, and individuals acting on their own behalf. These actors are often 
involved in transnational advocacy networks (TANs) to help with the collaborative efforts.  
Ronald Deibert and Masashi Crete-Nishihata introduced cyberspace within the global 
digital communications environment as embedded in political, economic, and social activity 
(Deibert and Crete-Nishihata, 2012, p. 339). Information controls are a highly researched area 
within cyberspace and involve the actions that seek to deny, disrupt, manipulate, and shape 
information and communication for strategic and political ends. It is for that reason, that there 
needs to be global governance of cyberspace controls in the form of policies and regulations. It is 
important to consider the international dynamics and mechanisms of cyberspace controls as 
unique processes that occur at the international level, different from the domestic state level. A 
lot of disruptions with cyber-attacks are not reversible. However, “a large and distributed social 
movement, which cuts across civil society, the private sector, and governments aims to protect 
and preserve cyberspace as an open common of global information,” (Diebert, Crete-Nishihata, 
2012, p. 355). This will require legal, regulatory, and discursive intervention followed by a 
rigorous checks and balances system.  
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Global Commons 
Global commons – sea, air, space, and cyberspace – enable militaries to protect national 
territory and interests; they also help to facilitate the passage of goods, people, communication, 
and data upon which every member of the international community depends (Murphy, 2010, p. 
28). Murphy states that the security of one global common is tightly linked to the security of all 
global commons. These global commons exist beyond the sovereign bounds of any nation, and 
collaborative governance must be achieved through international treaty or agreement.  
Cyberspace is the most unique of the commons as it is man-made and facilitates the 
transfer of information and data; it is also in large part owned by the private sector. It is the issue 
of ownership that complicates governance and requires a high level of public and private sector 
cooperation and collaboration. Attribution is also a challenge in the cyberspace common as 
pinpointing the source of an attack has serious implications for reprisal and deterrence (Murphy, 
2010, p.40). The greatest vulnerability is the infrastructure. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense 
William Lynn underscored this vulnerability at a discussion on cybersecurity: 
“With 15,000 networks and 7 million computing devices used by our Department, we 
have formally recognized cyberspace for what it is – a domain similar to land, sea, air, 
and space. A domain that we must depend upon and protect,” (Murphy, 2010, p.40). 
The U.S. is virtually under constant cyber-attacks that go beyond the Defense Department into 
critical infrastructure systems such as power grids and transportation systems. Twenty-first 
century global challenges demand global solutions between both private and public sectors, the 
global state, and non-state actors. 
There has been some government resistance to cybersecurity in the private sector. The 
U.S. faces major cyber-attacks by criminals and agents of foreign governments; these attacks 
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affect the military and the private sector alike. Protecting the private sector is important because 
the U.S. relies so heavily on private corporations to ensure national security. Corporations 
manufacture most of the nation’s arms, software and hardware, and carry out many critical 
security functions to include the collection and processing of intelligence and the conduct of 
covert operations (Etzioni, 2011, p. 58). This began during the administration of President 
George W. Bush and has only slightly been scaled back in the current administration. It is 
interesting to think that at one time, security was only provided to the computers and internet 
used by the public sector. 
Today’s cyber defense is not completely effective against most forms of advanced cyber-
attacks. A cyber preparedness framework can help an organization provide insight into threats 
and provide ideas on ways to counter threats. The framework is unique and specific to an 
organization and can be characterized by the nature of the threat, the technical and operational 
capabilities that the organization has to combat the threat, and process capabilities to include, 
risk assessment and governance policies and processes that the organization uses to determine its 
cyber threat level. Organizations that have the potential to face cyber threats should have a 
commensurate level of preparedness. A cyber threat level of 1 for cyber vandalism should have a 
level 1 cyber preparedness level of perimeter defense. Level 2 cyber threat level of cyber 
theft/crime corresponds with critical information protection, level 3 cyber incursion/surveillance 
has a cyber preparedness level of critical information protection; level 4 cyber 
sabotage/espionage should have a cyber preparedness level of architectural resilience, and level 5 
cyber conflict/warfare should have a commensurate level of pervasive agility (Bodeau, Graubart, 
and Fabius-Greene, 2009, p. 3). The preparedness levels and their corresponding threat levels 
should be defined (through roles and responsibilities) in a governance framework or model. 
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While current approaches to cybersecurity are not entirely effective, the threat arising 
from cyberspace to national security to human-centric information ethics could be detrimental. 
The problem with cybersecurity is that it is under produced, both in a traditional state-focused 
national security sense, and from a human security perspective (Cavelty, 2014, p. 710). The issue 
is directly linked to power-struggles, war-fighting, and military action. States are spending more 
money on cyber-offense, which is leading to less security. The type of cybersecurity that is being 
produced is based on economic maxims, often not considering security needs (Cavelty, 2014, p. 
711). Extending national security based on cyberspace could have an impact on civil liberties 
including the right to privacy and free speech. Cyber-exploitation linked to the manipulation of 
vulnerabilities is also plaguing cyberspace and making it less secure. Ethics needs to be 
considered especially now that cyberspace has become more than just a technological realm; it 
has become a fundamental part of life and is constantly changing.  
There is a considerable insecurity in cyberspace security because offense is cheaper than 
defense. Because of this, many people think it is ungovernable; however, in practice, there are 
many areas of private and public governance. Technical standards related to internet protocols 
are set by consensus among engineers involved in the non-governmental Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and others (Nye, 2014, p. 5). How 
these standards are applied often depends upon corporate decisions and their inclusion in 
commercial products. Applying the framework developed by Elinor Ostrom, cyberspace is 
categorized as a common pool resource; exclusion is difficult and exploitation by one party can 
subtract value from other parties (Nye, 2014, p. 6). Ostrom said that government is not the sole 
solution. However, providing security is a classic function of government and has led to an 
increased role for governments and governance in cyberspace. The number of criminal attacks 
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has increased with estimates of global costs ranging from US$80-400 billion annually (Lewis 
and Baker, 2013, p. 5). This is affecting corporations such as banking and financial firms who 
are developing their own systems of security and punishment through networks of 
connectedness. They deprive repeat offenders of trading rights, slow speeds, and raise 
transaction costs for addresses that are suspected of cyber-attacks.  
Regimes are a subset of norms (descriptive, prescriptive, or both) which are shared 
expectations about appropriate behavior. They can be institutionalized and have a hierarchy. 
Norms can be mixed with institutions and procedures in both large and small scale. The Regime 
Complex for Managing Global Cyber Activities consists of intelligence community alliances, 
international law conventions, human rights regimes, government groupings, telecom regimes, 
regional organizations, civil rights organizations, international finance institutions, trade regimes, 
intellectual property regimes, and law enforcement cooperation (Nye, 2014, p. 12). Inside of that 
outer circle are corporate decisions, incident response regimes, conferences, independent 
commissions, industrial ICT standards, and international policy standards. Issues in the cyber 
regime complex include DNS/standards, crime, war/sabotage, espionage, privacy, content 
control, and human rights (Nye, 2014, p. 12). 
Progress is being made in the cyber regime complex. An example is the increase in the 
number of states acceding to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, and 
INTERPOL has established a cybercrime center in Singapore (Nye, 2014, p. 12). However, trust 
still remains an issue. There have been many attacks and analysts reinforce their pessimistic 
projections by pointing to realist theories about the decline of U.S. hegemony over the internet 
(Nye, 2014, p. 12). One thing is clear; predicting normative structures that will govern 
cyberspace is impossible with the rapid changes in economic and political interests, and the 
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social and generational cognitive evolution that affects how state and non-state actors understand 
and define their interests (Nye, 2014, p. 13).  
Cybersecurity Governance 
Attempts to understand state cybersecurity arrangements, programs, policies, and 
approaches in a comparative way are ongoing but still immature undertakings. Most attempts 
have been made by journalists for reasons of public awareness, oversight, and illustrating the 
state of affairs for experts in the field. These range from work by state and local specific 
publications like State Tech magazine, Gov Tech magazine and Route Fifty, to journalistic 
coverage by national outlets ranging from Vice to the New York Times focused on narrower high-
profile issues like state election security or state data breaches. However, this journalism is not 
designed to assess the success of different states, programs, or approaches, and certainly is not 
intended to do so in any systematic or comparative way. 
There have been a few attempts to compare and evaluate in a more systematic way, but it 
is not yet as mature as things undertaken in other fields – something like the American Societies 
of Civil Engineers (ASCE) report card approach to comparative assessment of state 
infrastructure. Nonprofits, research institutes, contractors, think-tanks, and even individual 
researchers have made attempts to look at state cybersecurity structures and practices in a 
systematic and comparable way. However, none have examined all fifty states rigorously or in 
depth, AND focused solely on the issue of cybersecurity governance. Some have looked at issues 
of cyber governance, and one has looked at one particular area of cyber governance across fifty 
states, but holistic and in-depth analysis of state cyber processes is a major - and expensive - 
undertaking. 
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The researcher Francesca Spidalieri attempted to capture some insight about key state 
response capabilities and response capabilities for eight states, in her report for the Pell Center 
(Spidalieri, 2015). While this touched on governance issues, they were not the main focus of the 
report. She identified a predominant method to combat cyber risks today by pursuing the latest 
security products, tools, and technology plans, noting that technology is key, but not the only 
necessary component (Spidalieri, 2015). Education and training users is crucial to effectively 
implement advances in state cybersecurity measures. States should work on partnership building 
with the larger security community, including “federal, state, and local stakeholders, to 
coordinate security efforts and equip state employees with the necessary education and training” 
(Spidalieri, 2015, p. 4). For critical infrastructure security, states are leveraging laws, regulations, 
standards, market incentives, and other initiatives to align state priorities with national priorities. 
Spidalieri also summarized a given state’s “cyber readiness” based on the Cyber Readiness Index 
1.0 (CRI) scale, which is comprised of five essential areas: State Cyber Security Strategic Plan, 
Incident Response, E-Crime and Law Enforcement, Information Sharing, Cyber Research and 
Development, Education, and Capacity Building. 
Natasha Cohen and Brian Nussbaum examined three state’s innovative approaches to 
particular components of state cybersecurity in depth, looking at Arizona, New Jersey, and 
Washington State (Cohen and Nussbaum, 2018). The Homeland Security Systems Engineering 
and Development Institute (HSSEDI) undertook a series of state case studies, on behalf of the 
National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) that looked at cyber governance, including much overlap with how 
this analysis would define it (although with other things included). The DHS-NASCIO MITRE 
report also known as State Cybersecurity Governance Case Studies looked at trends to include: 
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strategy and planning, budget and acquisition, risk identification and mitigation, incident 
response, information sharing, workforce and education, and proactive leadership. Other trends 
looked at engagement of private sector, focus on local government priorities, and a centralized 
multi-stakeholder approach (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, 2017). 
Authority is needed to set strategy and formal mechanisms are needed to adapt to strategy 
in all trends. The MITRE report also said it was important to identify and set definitions of 
incidents, authorities, and responsibilities. It is important to have formal governance mechanisms 
in place to get the private and public sector partners involved in the process. Strategies should be 
long-term and transcend administrations and engage stakeholders beyond IT, across different 
agencies and branches of government (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, 2017). 
Other possible factors outside of the NASCIO document include the adoption of a framework, 
identifying a leadership “champion,” individual agency empowerment in the context of overall 
strategy, and integration with an organization’s risk management operations. 
State Cybersecurity Governance Case Studies looked at Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, 
Virginia, and Washington State’s governance programs and initiatives. Of particular interest for 
this study are the models being used by each respective state, level of legislative involvement in 
the governance model, perceived success of each state’s governance model, levels of innovation, 
and levels of effort put forth in each state. This review will further emphasize which model, if 
any is the most successful in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, and whether or not level of 
legislative or governor involvement leads to more success and easier implementation across the 
board. It will also help to identify key components of each model (centralized, decentralized, and 
hybrid). 
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Georgia. The state’s cybersecurity programs are governed through a unified and 
coordinated approach across the executive branch. There are tangible laws in place with the 
centralized authority for technology being the Georgia Technology Authority (GTA). The 
governor is highly involved in cybersecurity issues and utilizes many different mechanisms to 
create sharing of information across government and public and private sectors. The state has 
created the Hull McKnight Georgia Cyber Innovation and Training Center and has seen an 
increase in the cyber workforce as a result (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, 
2017, pp. A1-A25). 
Michigan. Michigan uses a centralized/unified and coordinated approach and has five 
cyber councils that make up their cybersecurity governing body. This allows the state to be 
adaptable and agile with cybersecurity risk and assessments. Legislation is not the foundation of 
the cybersecurity governance framework, though the state does have a strategic cyber plan in 
place. Michigan utilizes the Merit Network to address cyber workforce gaps, focusing on 
civilians. The overall cybersecurity focus is on the entire state of Michigan, rather than 
segregating out the “government.” The Chief Information Officer for the state shares information 
across industries, and there is collaboration between different entities. The governor is heavily 
involved in cybersecurity. The state also employs CISO as a Service (shared service) and 
recognizes that it may not be cost effective to have multiple CISOs within the state and local 
governments. According to this case study, the significance of Michigan’s centralized approach 
to cybersecurity governance is that it introduces a new way of thinking – thinking outside of the 
“government” box and has a cross ecosystem governance approach to incident response 
(Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, 2017, pp. B1-B25). 
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New Jersey. The state uses a hybrid approach to cybersecurity governance, though there 
is centralization for the IT acquisition process. In 2007, a law was passed that consolidated IT 
services across the executive branch agencies into one agency, the Office of Information 
Technology (OIT). An executive order established the New Jersey Cybersecurity & 
Communication Integration Cell (NJCCIC) – a centralized civilian body to “coordinate 
cybersecurity information sharing, perform cybersecurity threat analysis, and promote shared and 
situational awareness between and among the public and private sectors,” (Cybersecurity & 
Infrastructure Security Agency, 2017, pp. C1-C25). It is part of the New Jersey Homeland 
Security and Preparedness Office. The CISO serves a Homeland Security function, and governs 
cybersecurity as an enterprise-wide strategic issue across government and public and private 
sectors. The state has multiple information sharing entities (such as the Financial ISAC) and 
partners with SANS to address cyber education gaps (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security 
Agency, 2017, pp. C1-C25). 
 Virginia. Virginia operates cybersecurity in a very centralized approach. All branches of 
the government are involved, and they utilize the Virginia State Police as the lead agency for 
threat response. The Virginia Information Technology Agency (VITA) is in charge of 
governance as stated by law under the Secretary of Technology (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure 
Security Agency, 2017, pp. D1-D25). 
 Washington. The state utilizes a hybrid approach to cybersecurity governance, under 
legislature and law. The CIO and CISO advise state legislators and the governor’s office on a 
range of cyber-related strategic issues. Current CIO Michael Cockrill notes, “technology is 
involved in everything our citizens do, especially related to privacy and cybersecurity, so I spend 
a lot of my time consulting with state legislators and the governor’s office about public policy 
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issues related to technology and cybersecurity,” (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security 
Agency, 2017, pp. E1-E25). The governance of risk is shared by the CISO and the military in the 
state. It also includes public and private sector organizations and helps manage significant 
incidents. The state is in the process of developing their own state, local, tribal, and territorial 
(SLTT) information and sharing analysis center (ISAC) (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security 
Agency, 2017, pp. E1-E25). 
The closest analysis to looking at cyber governance broadly across states is work done by 
the National Governors Association (NGA) in 2017. Michael Garcia, David Forscey, and 
Timothy Blute of the NGA produced an interesting study of state cybersecurity that looked at all 
states. While it looked at issues of cyber governance, it had a pretty strong focus on one 
component of that – IT centralization (Garcia, Forscey, and Blute, 2017). Garcia and colleagues 
said that “assessing the impact of cybersecurity policy requires a bottom-up flow of information 
from citizens to businesses to federal government,” (Garcia et al., 2017, p. 253). The core 
challenge for state cybersecurity professionals is not technical, but rather a challenge related to 
cybersecurity governance (Garcia et al., 2017, p. 253). This document mentioned the three 
models for governance, noting that a centralized system provides state Chief Information 
Security Officers (CISOs) with the necessary authority to implement best practices and delegate 
accountability (Garcia et al., 2017, p. 254). States are classified as centralized in different ways; 
this includes through legal authority, leveraging the power of the governor's office, data 
management, and unification of agency IT with the state’s IT agency. A centralized model can 
fail if stakeholders are not engaged enough. They found that IT security centralization is a 
starting point, (a launching point) to expand cybersecurity governance beyond mere networks. 
They identified “degrees of centralization” by looking at six indicators for state IT: ability to 
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craft a statewide IT strategy, authority over statewide IT budget or authorization for IT projects 
across the state enterprise, managerial control over IT personnel across the executive branch, 
ability to implement statewide IT policies and standards, coordination of all IT activities, and 
level of legislative approval (Garcia et al., 2017, p. 265). IT centralization can improve 
information security and should primarily be done through a kind of cybersecurity task force, 
commission, or council. These groups can be leveraged to construct the cybersecurity strategy 
used to improve overall cybersecurity governance and posture. 
Critique 
The available literature contributes greatly to a collective understanding of state 
cybersecurity efforts, state cybersecurity governance, and cybersecurity governance in general, 
but there is still much more research needed before a clearer picture emerges of the “state” of 
cyber governance among the states. The consensus is the same; more needs to be done, and it 
needs to be continuous. Just as fast as technology changes, threats change to accommodate and 
break the new technology. It is evident that there is still some disagreement on what needs to 
take place to thwart and prevent cyber-attacks, and who needs to be involved. There is a need for 
collaboration, and there are many different types of regimes. This is to be expected, though, as 
different entities have different needs. A small organization with five employees that sells 
stationary is not going to have the same cybersecurity needs as the World Bank, for example.  
Conclusion 
Internet and cyber governance have become strategic issues where political, economic, 
and social stakes meet. It is ever-changing, and the need is substantial. Phishing, cloning, identity 
theft, and stealing passwords are just a few of the ways that cybercriminals are compromising 
organizations and government entities. The levels and types of threats criminals are using are 
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ever-changing because of changes and advances in technology. Research has shown that 
collaboration is a powerful tool in cyber defense, but it too must change constantly with 
advances in technology and the invention and introduction of new threats.  
The Center for Internet Security is a major player in the cyber defense schema. They are 
trusted world-wide and have developed 100+ Benchmarks across 14 different technology groups 
that serve as configuration guidelines to safeguard systems against cyber threats. The CIS 
Benchmarks and CIS Controls are recognized as the global standard and best practices for 
securing IT systems and data against the most pervasive attacks (CIS, 2019). Their guidelines are 
collaboratively refined and verified by a global community of IT professionals that volunteer 
their time to the effort.  
Leadership and authority within cybersecurity collaborative efforts needs more research 
and examination. Cybersecurity studies are often oriented to solving policy problems at the 
expense of theory-building and methodological innovation. Studies have found that 
cybersecurity is undermined by vulnerabilities in products and systems. Failure to heed experts is 
a major source of vulnerability. Failure to heed experts is a known problem in technology. 
Collaboratively, these issues need to be addressed to improve cybersecurity defense and to 
eliminate and overcome barriers. This study aims to fill the gaps in today’s literature and theory 
by introducing cybersecurity governance initiatives, interest-based (risk-based) problem-solving 
and conflict resolution techniques, and different models (centralized, decentralized, and hybrid) 
created around a state’s needs.  
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Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
Introduction 
When it comes to cybersecurity governance programs, state leaders are tasked with a lot 
to ensure that their state and state agencies are protected and able to thwart pervasive cyber 
threats and attacks; however, they cannot do it alone. Generally, state leaders (governor’s and 
legislatures) have someone in charge of their cybersecurity and IT governance programs that 
report back to them, and are responsible for implementing the governance structures. The annual 
Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) has documented that most state and local 
organizations are assessed below the recommended minimum grade for cybersecurity (MS-
ISAC, 2018, p. 2). Moreover, most states have made limited progress in improving their 
cybersecurity resiliency. Surveys of Chief Information Officers (CIOs), Chief Information 
Security Officers (CISOs), and other individuals responsible for cybersecurity in their state have 
identified (via the NCSR) that weak IT and cybersecurity governance, often resulting from 
diffused authority and complex organization structures, is a significant contributor to the slow 
progress in improving their state’s cybersecurity posture (MS-ISAC, 2018, p. 2).  
Approach 
This study uses a positivist approach. It is believed that a positivist approach is the best 
way to handle the data collection in this research because the study will be looking at the 
regularities and correlation between different elements. It will also involve summarizing 
identified patterns into generalized findings. “A positivist perspective privileges the researcher as 
the authority in the research process due to his or her objective, value-neutral stance, and his or 
her use of standardized measurement instruments,” (Hesse-Biber, 2017, p. 6). This approach 
assigns direct roles to the researcher and the participants in the study, and seeks to find out the 
truth. In the case of this study, the use of a positivist approach helps answer the research 
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question: Is a centralized cybersecurity governance model the most successful (effective and 
efficient) framework and can this model/framework be successfully implemented at the state 
level? It also helps identify patterns between the different governance models (centralized, 
decentralized, and hybrid), and levels of success and/or efficiency. To study the cybersecurity 
governance process, previous NCSR data was utilized to see if quantitatively, there is a 
correlation between higher NCSR scores and the model implemented by the state. Higher scores 
mean more successful cybersecurity programs. This is the primary quantitative data. Using a 
positivist approach, the researcher must remain objective and not allow values and/or biases to 
affect the research (Hesse-Biber, 2017, p. 12). Analysis of the NCSR data allowed for a 
deductive mode of inquiry and tested the hypothesis that states with centralized authority over 
cybersecurity governance will have higher NCSR scores (higher scores = more successful 
cybersecurity programs) than states that utilize a decentralized or hybrid model. Using a 
positivist approach, it is clear (both quantitatively and qualitatively) that patterned relationships 
exist. 
Twelve telephone interviews (primary qualitative data) were conducted with leaders 
responsible for implementing cybersecurity governance initiatives for their states. From a 
positivist perspective, the interviews offered a more personal understanding of the state’s stance 
on cybersecurity governance and level of governor/legislature involvement. The interviews also 
answered questions about the conditions, decisions, and actions that led to the successful (or 
unsuccessful) design, implementation, and ongoing use of cybersecurity governance at the state 
level. Sticking to a set of primary questions and follow-on questions allowed the research to be 
conducted in an unbiased manner as answers were recorded based on previously identified 
patterns per governance model.  
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Participant Sample 
The sample for part of this study includes analysis and data from a past Nationwide 
Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) assessment (2018); representatives (CIOs, CISOs, and state 
leaders) from 43 states and 342 state agencies answered questions via survey about their 
cybersecurity governance models. Another aspect of the study on cybersecurity governance 
models comes in the way of interviews to answer the research question: Is a centralized 
cybersecurity governance model the most successful (effective and efficient) framework and can 
this model/framework be successfully implemented at the state level? A team, made up of 
personnel from the Center for Internet Security (CIS), the Center for Technology in Government 
(CTG) at the University of Albany, State University of New York, and myself (collaboratively) 
identified 15 candidate states for a study on collaborative cybersecurity governance and the 
effectiveness of collaborative cybersecurity governance at the state level. The 15 states included:  
1. Georgia  
2. Tennessee  
3. Washington  
4. North Dakota  
5. Texas  
6. Virginia  
7. New Jersey  
8. Colorado  
9. Illinois  
10. Michigan  
11. Hawaii  
12. Mississippi  
13. Vermont  
14. Florida  
15. North Carolina  
 
 From CIS, five states were chosen from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
study that did not draw conclusions on how the governance models worked. North Dakota was 
selected because of the recent ‘buzz’ regarding their holistic approach to cybersecurity 
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governance. Texas was selected as the CIO sits on the CIS Board. Three candidate states were 
suggested by the CIS Security Operations Center manager. The remaining five states were noted 
by CIS staff for responsiveness and their varied approaches to governance. NCSR data and 
scores were not used to choose the candidates. 
 Eleven of the candidate states agreed to participate in the study: Florida (decentralized), 
Tennessee (centralized), North Dakota (centralized), New Jersey (hybrid), Texas (decentralized), 
Virginia (centralized), Illinois (centralized), Michigan (centralized), Hawaii (hybrid), Mississippi 
(decentralized), and North Carolina (decentralized). New Hampshire (hybrid) also agreed to 
participate, though they were not on the initial candidate list. For the states interviewed (per the 
NCSR data), five are centralized, five are hybrid, and two are decentralized. However, some of 
the answers received during the interviews contradicted the data obtained from the NCSR. Per 
the interviews, five states identified as centralized, four as decentralized, and three as hybrid. 
Concepts 
In order to answer the research question: Is a centralized cybersecurity governance model 
the most successful (effective and efficient) framework and can this model/framework be 
successfully implemented at the state level?, it is important to define the concepts that make up 
the research question. According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, cybersecurity is defined as 
“measures taken to protect a computer or computer system against unauthorized attack,” 
(Merriam-Webster, n.d.). Emerson and Nabatchi define governance as the “act of governing, or 
how actors use processes and make decisions to exercise authority and control, grant power, take 
action, and ensure performance—all of which are guided by the sets of principles, roles, and 
procedures around which actors converge,” (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015, p. 230). 
“Cybersecurity governance is the process through which humans understand organizational risk, 
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prioritize resources, and establish procedures to erect technical defenses against computer-based 
attacks,” (Garcia, Forscey, and Blute, 2017, p. 254). Cybersecurity governance defines priorities, 
processes, metrics, tolerances, and implementation methods. It is codified in law and/or 
executive orders and provides a framework for written policies and procedures; cybersecurity 
governance integrates with, and reflects the structure of the state’s overall IT governance.  
The study looked at three cybersecurity governance models: centralized, decentralized, 
and hybrid. Per the NCSR and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a 
centralized governance structure is defined as one where information security governance/policy 
authority and decision-making powers are vested solely within a central body (MS-ISAC, 2018). 
In a decentralized structure, those powers are distributed to individual sub-organizations. Hybrid 
governance structures are a mix between both central body and individual sub-organizations 
having information security governance authority (MS-ISAC, 2018). These definitions are used 
extensively throughout the rest of this dissertation to describe centralized, decentralized, and 
hybrid models of cybersecurity governance. For the purpose of this research study, the word 
“framework” can be used interchangeably with the word “model”; cybersecurity governance 
framework and cybersecurity governance model have the same meaning.  
Operationalization: Quantitative Analysis 
The study employed a quantitative research design with three independent variables 
(centralized, decentralized, and hybrid governance models) and one independent variable (NCSR 
score). The main purpose of the study was to investigate how the independent variables were 
related to levels of scores as reported by each state on the Nationwide Cybersecurity Review 
(NCSR). The higher the score, the higher the success of the cybersecurity governance model. 
Success is measured by efficiency and effectiveness of the cybersecurity governance models. 
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Success is further amplified and measured by the five functions of the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework (CSF): identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. The NCSR data measures the 
effectiveness and efficiency (success or lack thereof) of each state and state agency’s 
cybersecurity governance programs. When answering the survey questions for the NCSR, state 
representatives ranked their current programs on a Likert scale from one to seven, where one 
equals “not performed”; two equals “informally done”; three equals “partially documented”; four 
equals “documented policy”; five equals “implementation in process”; six equals “tested and 
verified”; and, seven equals “optimized.” Higher scores reflect mature and effective 
cybersecurity programs.  
The NCSR is a no-cost, annual self-assessment designed to measure gaps and capabilities 
of state, local, tribal, and territorial governments’ cybersecurity programs (MS-ISAC, 2018). The 
NCSR is based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework 
(NIST CSF), and is sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Multi-
State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) (CIS, 2019). It provides actionable 
feedback and metrics, and evaluates cybersecurity maturity across the nation. All states (and 
agencies), local governments (and departments), tribal nations, and territorial governments can 
participate. This data was chosen as the NCSR is a well-respected and well-known survey in the 
field of cybersecurity and cybersecurity governance. The data is valid and reliable. The survey 
will help answer the research question: Is a centralized cybersecurity governance model the most 
successful (effective and efficient) framework and can this model/framework be successfully 
implemented at the state level? The data and findings should also test the hypothesis that states 
with centralized authority over cybersecurity governance will have higher NCSR scores (higher 
scores = more successful cybersecurity programs) than states that utilize a decentralized or 
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hybrid model. The following initial questions were asked of participants on the NCSR (via 
structured response format survey): 
1. How would you categorize your cybersecurity governance structure? 
 
• Centralized – Information security governance/policy authority and decision-
making powers are vested solely within a central body 
 
• Decentralized – Information security governance/policy authority and decision-
making powers are distributed to individual sub-organizations 
 
• Hybrid – Information security governance/policy authority and decision-making 
is distributed between a central body and individual sub-organizations 
 
2. How would you categorize your cybersecurity implementation and operations? 
 
• Centralized – Information security governance/policy authority and decision-
making powers are vested solely within a central body 
 
• Decentralized – Information security governance/policy authority and decision-
making powers are distributed to individual sub-organizations 
 
• Hybrid – Information security governance/policy authority and decision-making 
is distributed between a central body and individual sub-organizations 
 
3. Who are you answering the NCSR on behalf of? 
 
• Your organization only 
 
• Your organization and subordinate organization 
 
• Other (please specify) 
 
 The initial questions were followed by more specific questions related to cybersecurity 
maturity of their state’s governance frameworks based on the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework’s five functions. The five functions included in 
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) are: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. 
The 43 states that participated in the NCSR answered survey questions related to cybersecurity 
governance and these five functions. The five functions represent the five primary pillars for a 
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successful and holistic cybersecurity program (NIST, 2018). As related to cybersecurity 
governance at the state and state agency level, the functions help leaders to express the 
management of their cybersecurity risk at high levels and aid in the risk decision-making 
process.  
The “identify” function helps leaders develop an organizational understanding to 
managing cybersecurity risk. These risks can affect systems, people, assets, data, and 
capabilities. It is important to understand business context, resources that support critical 
functions, and the related cybersecurity risks; this allows decision-makers at the state and state 
agency level to focus and prioritize their efforts (NIST, 2018). Within this function, leaders can 
identify physical and software assets within the organization and hence start an asset 
management program. They can also identify the organization’s role in critical infrastructure and 
identify cybersecurity policies identified within the organization to define governance programs, 
and legal and regulatory requirements regarding the organization’s cybersecurity capabilities 
(NIST, 2018). It is in the “identify” function where vulnerabilities and internal and external 
threats can be assessed. Survey takers self-reported “identify” scores through categories of asset 
management (ID-AM), business environment (ID-BE), governance (ID-GV), risk assessment 
(ID-RA), risk management strategy (ID-RM), and supply chain risk management (ID-RM). 
The next function, “protect,” looks at appropriate safeguards and supports the ability to 
limit or contain the effects of a possible cybersecurity event. It offers protection for identity 
management and access control, and empowers staff through awareness and training. The 
“protect” function also establishes data security protection to safeguard an organization’s 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, and allows an organization to 
implement information protection processes and procedures (NIST, 2018). Organizations at the 
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state and state agency level can protect their resources through maintenance and manage 
protective technology to ensure their systems and security are compliant with policies, 
procedures, and agreements. The “protect” scores include categories of identity management and 
access control (PR-AC), awareness and training (PR-AT), data security (PR-DS), information 
protection processes and procedures (PR-IP), maintenance (PR-MA), and protective technology 
(PR-PT).  
The “detect” function defines the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a 
cybersecurity event (NIST, 2018). This function allows cybersecurity events to be discovered in 
a timely manner, and the potential impact to be understood. Organizations should implement 
continuous security monitoring to verify the effectiveness of the protective measures that are in 
place. Individual self-reported “detect” scores are broken down into categories of anomalies and 
events (DE-AE), security continuous monitoring (DE-CM), and detection processes (DE-DP).  
The fourth NIST CSF function is “respond.” This function includes activities the 
organization must act on in regard to a cybersecurity incident. It gives the organization the 
support to contain the impact of the potential cybersecurity threat. The “respond” function 
ensures that response planning processes are in place and executed appropriately during and after 
an event. Leaders should communicate with stakeholders, law enforcement, and external 
stakeholders during this phase as appropriate. The organization will analyze their response and 
support recovery activities; mitigation activities are performed to prevent a future event and 
resolve the current situation. The organization should discuss improvements to their response 
plan by incorporating lessons learned from current and previous events. “Respond” scores 
include categories of response planning (RS-RP), communications (RS-CO), analysis (RS-AN), 
mitigation (RS-MI), and improvements (RS-IM).  
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The final function, the “recover” function, identifies appropriate activities to maintain 
plans for resiliency; it also gives the organization the opportunity to restore any capabilities or 
services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event (NIST, 2018). The “recover” function 
reduces the impact to the organization and allows the organization to implement recovery 
planning processes and procedures. The organization can improve upon its processes and 
procedures based on lessons learned. Recovery planning (RC-RP), improvements (RC-IM), and 
communications (RC-CO) comprise “recover” averages on the NCSR.  
The NIST CSF’s five functions (identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover) all 
directly relate to cybersecurity governance. The functions are “must haves” for a successful and 
holistic cybersecurity program (NIST, 2018). A critical role of cybersecurity governance is to 
ensure that discussions about risk and risk response, in terms of state-level policy and strategy, 
are taking place and that those discussions are leading to actions designed to manage risk.  
The state’s representatives that participated in the 2018 NCSR answered additional 
questions through self-reporting, related to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework’s five functions 
of identify (ID), protect (PR), detect (DE), respond (RS), and recover (RC) as they relate to 
cybersecurity governance. There are 108 additional subcategories, which are outcome driven 
statements for creating or improving a cybersecurity program. NCSR participants self-reported 
their rankings in each category and subcategory on a Likert scale from one to seven. Table 1 
identifies the 23 NIST CSF categories per function.  
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Table 1 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework Categories 
Function Category ID 
Identify Asset Management 
Business Environment 
Governance 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Management Strategy 
Supply Chain Risk Management 
 
ID.AM 
ID.BE 
ID.GV 
ID.RA 
ID.RM 
ID.SC 
Protect Identity Mgmt./Access Control 
Awareness and Training 
Data Security 
Information Protection Process & Procedure 
Maintenance 
Protective Technology 
 
PR.AC 
PR.AT 
PR.DS 
PR.IP 
PR.MA 
PR.PT 
Detect Anomalies and Events 
Security Continuous Monitoring 
Detection Processes 
DE.AE 
DE.CM 
DE.DP 
 
Respond Response Planning 
Communications 
Analysis 
Mitigation 
Improvements 
 
RS.RP 
RS.CO 
RS.AN 
RS.MI 
RS.IM 
Recover Recovery Planning 
Improvements 
Communications 
 
RC.RP 
RC.IM 
RC.CO 
Note. Adapted from “Cybersecurity Framework: The five functions,” by NIST, (2018, July 25). 
Retrieved from https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/online-learning/five-functions 
 The study looked at average NCSR scores in each category (including subcategories) and 
also looked at Total Average (of all average category scores). A completely optimal 
cybersecurity program is a seven; for the purpose of this study, a four and up average NCSR 
score is considered heading in the right direction and successful (4 = documented policy, 5 = 
implementation in process, 6 = tested and verified). Higher NCSR scores should be seen in states 
that exercise a centralized cybersecurity governance model.  
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Continuous Governance  
In establishing an effective framework and governance capabilities, a team comprised of 
members from the Center for Internet Security (CIS) and the Center for Technology in 
Government (CTG) at the University of Albany, State University of New York, have identified 
five steps in the continuous governance process to include, the who, the authority, the scope, 
process, and feedback. “Who” includes those involved and also those affected by the 
governance. “Authority” is the who and the information that is needed to use the authority; 
“scope” is the application of the authority; “process” are the controls in place; and, “feedback” 
measures the controls and makes sure they are working. “Feedback” is sent back to the “who” to 
provide for continuous assessments.  
 
 Figure 1. Continuous Governance Process developed by CIS/CTG governance project team.  
 
Building upon the who, authority, scope, process, and feedback are the core components 
of governance, again identified by CIS and CTG for the purpose of this study. The components 
are strategic vision, which includes the who, authority, and scope; effectiveness/efficiency 
includes process and feedback; transparency is the feedback, who, and authority; accountability 
includes the who, authority, and scope; responsiveness is process and feedback; and, awareness 
encompasses everything – who authority, scope, process, and feedback.  
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Figure 2. Core Components of Governance as defined by CIS/CTG governance project team. 
The aforementioned DHS report, State Cybersecurity Governance Case Studies was used 
as a starting point for the qualitative research and to potentially identify candidate states for 
cybersecurity governance related interviews. The study looked at Georgia, Michigan, New 
Jersey, Virginia, and Washington State’s governance programs and initiatives. The different 
cybersecurity governance models (centralized, decentralized, and hybrid) were identified in the 
case study by state. Besides cybersecurity governance model used, other items per state were 
considered in the evaluation, including level of legislative involvement, perceived success of 
each state’s governance model, levels of innovation, and levels of effort put forth in each state. 
These items were written out with brief descriptions and the team members were allowed to do 
additional research into the program areas. After evaluating the five states in the DHS case study, 
the four team members rated each item of the core components of governance (strategic vision, 
effectiveness/efficiency, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and awareness) as defined 
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by CIS and CTG for each state on a Likert scale of one to five, with five being the highest 
(Figure 2). Much like the Likert scores of the NCSR, scores were similarly distributed:  
1 = not present; little or none (unsuccessful) 
2 = plans partially in place  
3 = in progress; making strides 
4 = plans in place and progress being made; room for improvement 
5 = optimized; fully implemented successful plans in place (successful) 
 
These ratings were applied on perception of success per the core components of 
governance for each state, dependent upon model used. CIS governance project team members 
individually rated the states and their initiatives in the DHS case study highlighting and 
discussing specific programs. Each team member assigned values for all components for all 
states; individual scores in each category were then averaged and appear in Table 2. The scores 
served as a means of identifying potential states to interview ONLY. They were further 
examined in conjunction with data acquired later in the study to see if these perceptions matched 
data acquired in individual interviews with state cybersecurity leaders and quantitative data 
perused in the NCSR. 
Concepts/Operationalization: Qualitative Analysis 
The same components were used when analyzing the interview data to identify 
correlations between “success” and cybersecurity governance model used, senior leadership 
involvement, actions taken by states to increase cybersecurity, and scope of the state’s 
cybersecurity programs. Twelve interviews were conducted over the telephone at the Center for 
Internet Security (CIS), by myself and members of CIS and CTG. All team members were 
present for all 12 interviews. The interviews were recorded and transcribed in WebEx, allowing 
for easy extraction of the data. The location did not influence the nature of the interviews, though 
it should be noted that CIS’s sponsorship probably prompted the interviewees to say “yes” to 
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being interviewed. There were no real challenges with these interviews, other than setting up 
time to conduct them. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, following a 
set of questions (Appendix B) similar to questions asked on the NCSR; however, there was room 
to deviate from said questions to ask follow-on questions depending on answers received. This is 
what made the interviews necessary and different from the NCSR (that uses a Likert scale). A 
list of questions (in a checklist format) were compiled prior to the interviews that included 
appropriate follow-on questions. Open-ended questions allowed the participants to elaborate and 
offer explanations. As each question was asked and subsequently answered, the answers were 
recorded (written) on the checklist.  
After going through each individual transcription of the 12 state interviews, answers were 
categorized by common themes (repetitive or patterned relationships between identified 
elements), and frequencies were tallied through a simple frequency count by category/theme 
(Bazeley, 2013, p. 192). Frequency refers to the number of times an event occurs. Common 
themes included: cybersecurity governance model used, senior leadership involvement, success 
or failure as reported by state representative, scope (private sector, local government, and/or 
individuals), benefits of cybersecurity governance, etc. Particular attention was paid to the 
cybersecurity governance model used, perceived success, and senior leadership involvement 
(since this study is looking at cybersecurity governance implemented at the state level 
(governor’s office)). The frequency tabulations were used to account for number of states and 
their relationship to each theme. The frequency count data was compared (in a side by side 
analysis) to data from the NCSR for each of the 12 states. Comparatively, it was used to identify 
differences in answers between the states’ answers on the NCSR and the interviews. There were 
many questions that could not be checked off or tallied because the answers were more 
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descriptive in nature. For example, one of the questions was “in your opinion, is your state’s 
approach to cybersecurity governance a success?” This answer could be tallied with a yes or no. 
However, the rest of the question asks “Why or why not? In what way?” Another question asked 
participants “what is the number one action you would recommend to any governor or other 
senior executive seeking to increase cybersecurity governance and cyber resiliency in their 
state?” A list of answers (some had crossover) and themes was compiled and used in the study as 
potential recommendations for initiating a collaborative cybersecurity governance framework at 
the state level.  
Though not all answers matched the NCSR results in terms of governance model used, 
the interviews created a clear picture of each state’s priorities as related to cybersecurity. The 
analysis further helped test the hypothesis and answer the research question, while also offering a 
personal perspective as to why and how certain initiatives are shaping each individual state’s 
cybersecurity governance programs.  
Evaluation of Assumptions 
 A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was chosen in this study as it examines 
“differences between groups with regard to one continuous dependent variable,” (Abu-Bader, 
2016, p. 11). The one-way ANOVA allows researchers to compare mean differences among two 
or more independent groups to determine statistical significance or lack thereof. This 
cybersecurity governance study examined whether there was an overall significant difference 
between the independent variables (model: centralized, decentralized, hybrid) with regard to 
(higher) NCSR score (dependent variable). Prior to conducting the analysis, the ANOVA 
assumptions of normality and homogeneity were also examined. The dependent variable (NCSR 
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score) was normally distributed among the sample size, and the variance of the dependent 
variable was equally distributed. 
Five different one-way ANOVAs were run comparing the averages of the five NCSR 
function scores (identify (ID), protect (PR), detect (DE), respond (RS), and recover (RC)) of 
centralized, decentralized, and hybrid cybersecurity governance models. The five functions 
represent the five primary pillars for a successful and holistic cybersecurity program (NIST, 
2018). If a significant difference was detected in the one-way ANOVA of the five NCSR 
function scores, a post hoc Tukey test was run to statistically compare each pair of groups 
(centralized/decentralized, centralized/hybrid, decentralized/hybrid) separately on the dependent 
variable of NCSR score. The post hoc test determines where differences exist. 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
Case Study Analysis 
Looking at Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington State’s governance 
programs and initiatives as identified in State Cybersecurity Governance Case Studies, the CIS 
governance project team, comprised of four members, rated the five states on a Likert scale from 
one to five on each of the core components of governance: strategic vision, effectiveness and 
efficiency, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and awareness. For the purpose of this 
case study analysis, 1= not present/little or none (unsuccessful); 2 = plans partially in place; 3 = 
in progress/making strides; 4 = plans in place and progress being made/room for improvement; 
and, 5 = optimized/fully implemented successful plans in place (successful).  
Table 2 
Case Study Analysis of Core Components of Governance by CIS 
 GA MI NJ VA WA 
Strategic 
Vision 
3.5 4 4 5 4 
Effectiveness / 
Efficiency 
4 5 4 4 4 
Transparency 4 4 3.5 4 4 
Accountability 4 5 3 5 4 
Responsiveness 4 4.5 3 4 4.5 
Awareness 
(average of 
above) 
3.9 4.5 3.5 4.4 4.1 
Note. Each state’s core components of governance were individually rated by four CIS 
governance project team members. The scores were then averaged for each state and core 
component. The scores served as a means of identifying potential states to interview only. 
The team paid particular attention to cybersecurity governance models (centralized, 
decentralized, and hybrid) used by each state, legislative involvement, perceived success of each 
state’s governance model, levels of innovation, and levels of effort put forth as mentioned in the 
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case studies to rate each of the core components. Each team member assigned values for all 
components for all states; individual scores in each category were then averaged. While only 
based on individual team perception and the perception of the author of the DHS case study, the 
five states (Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington) were deemed to be using 
successful governance models, having above average scores in the core components of 
governance. Above average scores in this instance were 3.5 or higher; all five states achieved 
this. These states were added to the list of potential interviewees (to be interviewed by the 
governance project team) to examine successful (effective and efficient) governance models at 
the state level.  
NCSR Data 
 Per the Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), a centralized governance structure is defined as one where 
information security governance/policy authority and decision-making powers are vested solely 
within a central body (MS-ISAC, 2018). In a decentralized structure, those powers are 
distributed to individual sub-organizations (MS-ISAC, 2018). Hybrid governance structures are a 
mix between both central body and individual sub-organizations having information security 
governance authority (MS-ISAC, 2018). Forty-three states and more than 300 state agencies 
answered the 2018 NCSR. Out of the 43 states reporting, 17 answered (via survey) that they 
were centralized, three decentralized, and 23 were hybrid. Out of the 342 total state agencies 
reporting, 176 identified as following a centralized governance model, 17 followed a 
decentralized model, and 149 used a hybrid model.  
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Table 3 
 NCSR Data – Number of Survey Participants by Governance Model 
Model State State Agency 
Centralized 17 176 
Decentralized 3 17 
Hybrid 23 149 
Total 43 342 
Note. Numbers came from raw data on NCSR spreadsheet. 
The NCSR tests the cybersecurity maturity of a state’s governance framework based on 
the NIST CSF’s five functions: identify (ID), protect (PR), detect (DE), respond (RS), and 
recover (RC). The identify function and the protect function each have six categories, detect has 
three, respond has five, and recover has three. Individual self-reported scores in each category 
within each function were examined. The categories cover the breadth of cybersecurity 
objectives for an organization, while not being overly detailed. They cover topics across cyber, 
physical, and personnel, with a focus on business outcomes. Within each category in the 
functions are subcategories that survey takers also answered questions about. Subcategories are 
the deepest level of abstraction. There are 108 subcategories, which are outcome driven 
statements for creating or improving a cybersecurity program. NCSR participants self-reported 
their rankings in each category and subcategory on a Likert scale from one to seven: 
1 = not performed 
2 = informally done 
3 = partially documented 
4 = documented policy 
5 = implementation in process 
6 = tested and verified 
7 = optimized 
 
These scores and their corresponding meanings are the same for all questions on the 
NCSR. The research subsequently looked at the average of each category and function. At the 
state level, the 17 states that deployed a centralized cybersecurity governance model had an 
average NCSR score of 5.04; the average for the three decentralized states was 3.12; and, the 23 
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hybrid states averaged 4.67. State agency NCSR score averages were closer in comparison to 
state averages. 
Table 4 
NCSR Data – Average Scores by Governance Model at the State and State Agency Level 
 State Average State Agency Average 
Centralized 5.04 4.82 
Decentralized 3.12 4.42 
Hybrid 4.67 4.68 
Total 4.70 4.74 
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data. 
The average (self-reported) ID score for states that utilized a centralized model of 
cybersecurity governance was 4.60; decentralized was 3.09; and, hybrid approaches averaged 
4.24. 
Table 5 
Average Self-Reported Identify (ID) Scores by Governance Model 
Governance Model Number of States Average Score 
Centralized 17 4.60 
Decentralized 3 3.09 
Hybrid 23 4.24 
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data. 
Averages of protect scores were higher in both centralized models and hybrid models 
(5.06 and 4.85, respectively) than those of states using a decentralized approach to governing 
their cybersecurity efforts (3.06). 
Table 6 
Average Self-Reported Protect (PR) Scores by Governance Model 
Governance Model Number of States Average Score 
Centralized 17 5.06 
Decentralized 3 3.06 
Hybrid 23 4.85 
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data. 
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States that use centralized cyber governance models had higher averages (5.24) than 
states that followed decentralized (3.05) and hybrid (4.84) models under the detect function. 
Table 7 
Average Self-Reported Detect (DE) Scores by Governance Model 
Governance Model Number of States Average Score 
Centralized 17 5.24 
Decentralized 3 3.05 
Hybrid 23 4.84 
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data. 
For the respond function, survey responses and NCSR scores for centralized 
cybersecurity governance models were higher (5.45) than decentralized (3.05) and hybrid (4.82) 
models being used. 
Table 8 
Average Self-Reported Respond (RS) Scores by Governance Model 
Governance Model Number of States Average Score 
Centralized 17 5.45 
Decentralized 3 3.05 
Hybrid 23 4.82 
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data. 
Finally, decentralized governance models (3.33) were lower than both centralized and 
decentralized models (4.84 and 4.59, respectively) in the fifth CSF function of recover.  
Table 9 
Average Self-Reported Recover (RC) Scores by Governance Model 
Governance Model Number of States Average Score 
Centralized 17 4.84 
Decentralized 3 3.33 
Hybrid 23 4.59 
Note. Averages identified after analysis of NCSR data. 
One-Way ANOVAs 
The one-way ANOVAs on the five NIST CSFs by cybersecurity governance model 
proved the hypothesis that states with centralized authority over cybersecurity governance will 
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have higher NCSR scores (higher scores = more successful cybersecurity programs) than states 
that utilize a decentralized or hybrid model. However, not all of the functions individually had 
significant differences between the models.  
ID Function 
The results of the one-way ANOVA of the Identify Function does not show an overall 
significant difference between the three cybersecurity governance models with regard to NCSR 
scores (Table 10: F = 2.618; df = 2, 40; p > .05). No post hoc tests were run because no 
significant results were detected. 
Table 10 
One-Way ANOVA Output—Average Identify (ID) Function  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Between Groups 6.059 2 3.030 2.618 .085 
Within Groups 46.289 40 1.157   
Total  52.349 42    
Note. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
PR Function 
The results of the one-way ANOVA of the Protect Function show an overall significant 
difference between the three cybersecurity governance models with regard to NCSR scores 
(Table 11.A: F = 5.181; df = 2, 40; p < .05).  
The results of the post hoc Tukey HSD test (Table 11.B) of the PR function show 
significant differences between the NCSR scores of states that use a centralized governance 
model and those that use a decentralized model (p = .007 or p < .05). These results also show 
significant differences in NCSR scores between states that use a hybrid model and those that use 
a decentralized model (p = .015 or p < .05). There was no significant difference between states 
that use a centralized model and those that use a hybrid approach to governing their 
cybersecurity programs. States that use a decentralized cybersecurity governance model had the 
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lowest PR NCSR scores (Table 11.C: mean = 3.0567), followed by states that use a hybrid model 
(mean = 4.8487) and states that use a centralized model for governing their cybersecurity 
programs (mean = 5.0553).  
Table 11.A 
One-Way ANOVA Output—Average Protect (PR) Function 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Between Groups 10.279 2 5.139 5.181 .010 
Within Groups 39.683 40 .992   
Total  49.962 42    
Note. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
Table 11.B 
 
Protect (PR) Post Hoc Tukey HSD—Multiple Comparisons  95% Confidence Interval 
Gov Model (I) (J) Gov Model Mean 
Diff (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 centralized 2 decentralized 
 3 hybrid 
1.99863* 
.20660 
.62374 
.31858 
.007 
.794 
.4805 
-.5688 
3.5168 
.9820 
2 decentralized 1 centralized 
 3 hybrid 
-1.99863* 
-1.79203* 
.62374 
.61141 
.007 
.015 
-3.5168 
-3.2802 
-.4805 
-.3039 
3 hybrid 1 centralized 
 2 decentralized 
-.20660 
1.79203* 
.31858 
.61141 
.794 
.015 
-.9820 
-.3039 
.5688 
3.2802 
Note. Dependent Variable: Average PR. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. *The mean difference 
is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 11.C 
Average Protect (PR) Function Descriptive Statistics    95% Confidence Interval 
  N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Min. Max. 
Centralized 17 5.0553 .84935 .20600 4.6186 5.4920 2.95 6.16 
Decentralized 3 3.0567 2.06001 1.18935 -2.0607 8.1740 1.00 5.12 
Hybrid 23 4.8487 .94516 .19708 4.4400 5.2574 2.80 6.59 
Total 43 4.8053 1.09067 .16633 4.4697 5.1410 1.00 6.59 
 
DE Function 
The results of the one-way ANOVA of the Detect Function show a significant difference  
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between governance models with regard to NCSR scores (Table 12.A: F = 5.028; df = 2, 40; p < 
.05).  
The results of the post hoc Tukey HSD test (Table 12.B) of the PR function show 
significant differences between the NCSR scores of states that use a centralized governance 
model and those that use a decentralized model (p = .008 or p < .05). These results also show 
significant differences in NCSR scores between states that use a hybrid model and those that use 
a decentralized model (p = .032 or p < .05). No significant difference is found between 
centralized and hybrid approaches. States that use a decentralized cybersecurity governance 
model had the lowest scores (Table 12.C: mean = 3.0500), followed by states that use a hybrid 
model (mean = 4.8352) and states that use a centralized cybersecurity governance model (mean 
= 5.2412).  
Table 12.A 
One-Way ANOVA Output—Average Detect (DE Function)  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Between Groups 12.307 2 6.154 5.028 .011 
Within Groups 48.955 40 1.224   
Total  61.262 42    
Note. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
Table 12.B 
 
Detect (DE) Post Hoc Tukey HSD—Multiple Comparisons  95% Confidence Interval 
Gov Model (I) (J) Gov Model Mean 
Diff (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 centralized 2 decentralized 
 3 hybrid 
2.19118* 
.40596 
.69279 
.35384 
.008 
.491 
.5050 
-.4553 
3.8774 
1.2672 
2 decentralized 1 centralized 
 3 hybrid 
-2.19118* 
-1.78522* 
.69279 
.67910 
.008 
.032 
-3.8774 
-3.4381 
-.5050 
-.1323 
3 hybrid 1 centralized 
 2 decentralized 
-.40596 
1.78522* 
.35384 
.67910 
.491 
.032 
-1.2672 
.1323 
.4553 
3.4381 
Note. Dependent Variable: Average DE. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. *The mean difference 
is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 12.C 
Average Detect (DE) Function Descriptive Statistics    95% Confidence Interval 
  N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Min. Max. 
Centralized 17 5.2412 .97275 .23593 4.7410 5.7413 2.80 6.79 
Decentralized 3 3.0500 2.07545 1.19826 -2.1057 8.2057 1.00 5.15 
Hybrid 23 4.8352 1.07027 .22317 4.3724 5.2980 2.03 6.24 
Total 43 4.8712 1.20774 .18418 4.4995 5.2428 1.00 6.79 
 
RS Function 
The results of the one-way ANOVA of the Respond Function show an overall significant 
difference between the three cybersecurity governance models with regard to NCSR scores 
(Table 13.A: F = 5.181; df = 2, 40; p < .05).  
The results of the post hoc Tukey HSD test (Table 13.B) of the RS function show 
significant differences between the NCSR scores of states that use a centralized governance 
model and those that use a decentralized model (p = .009 or p < .05). No significant difference is 
found between centralized and hybrid approaches and decentralized and hybrid governance 
approaches under the Respond Function. States that use a decentralized cybersecurity 
governance model had the lowest RS NCSR scores (Table 13.C: mean = 3.0553), followed by 
states that use a hybrid model (mean = 4.8196) and states that use a centralized model for 
governing their cybersecurity programs (mean = 5.4471).  
Table 13.A 
 
One-Way ANOVA Output—Average Respond (RS) Function 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Between Groups 15.382 2 7.691 5.181 .010 
Within Groups 59.381 40 1.485   
Total  74.763 42    
Note. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
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Table 13.B 
 
Respond (RS) Post Hoc Tukey HSD—Multiple Comparisons  95% Confidence Interval 
Gov Model (I) (J) Gov Model Mean 
Diff (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 centralized 2 decentralized 
 3 hybrid 
2.39373* 
.62749 
.76300 
.38970 
.009 
.253 
.5367 
-.3210 
4.2508 
1.5760 
2 decentralized 1 centralized 
 3 hybrid 
-2.39373* 
-1.76623* 
.76300 
.74792 
.009 
.059 
-4.2508 
-3.5866 
-.5367 
.0541 
3 hybrid 1 centralized 
 2 decentralized 
-.62749 
1.76623* 
.38970 
.74792 
.253 
.059 
-.1.5760 
-.0541 
.3210 
3.5866 
Note. Dependent Variable: Average RS. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. *The mean difference 
is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 13.C 
Average Respond (RS) Function Descriptive Statistics    95% Confidence Interval 
 N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Min. Max. 
Centralized 17 5.4471 1.05219 .25519 4.9061 5.9880 2.85 7.00 
Decentralized 3 3.0533 2.08051 1.20118 -2.1149 8.2216 1.00 5.16 
Hybrid 23 4.8196 1.22493 .25542 4.2899 5.3493 1.84 6.93 
Total 43 4.9444 1.33419 .20346 4.5338 5.3550 1.00 7.00 
 
RC Function 
The results of the one-way ANOVA of the Recover Function do not show an overall 
significant difference between the three cybersecurity governance models with regard to NCSR 
scores (Table 14: F = 1.563; df = 2, 40; p = .222 or p > .05). No post hoc tests were run because 
no significant results were detected. 
Table 14 
One-Way ANOVA Output—Average Recover (RC) Function  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Between Groups 5.763 2 2.881 1.563 .222 
Within Groups 73.756 40 1.844   
Total  79.519 42    
Note. Significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
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There was a significant difference between NCSR scores of states that adhered to 
centralized models and states that utilized decentralized models of cybersecurity governance. 
There was also a significant difference between NCSR scores of states that used hybrid 
approaches and those that used a decentralized model. While there was no significant difference 
between centralized and hybrid cybersecurity governance models used at the state level, overall, 
per each NIST (average) function score, centralized models scored the highest, followed by 
hybrid models, and then decentralized models. What was not seen in the statistical analysis 
(besides slightly higher scores for the centralized model) is the main difference in terms of 
success (effectiveness and efficiency) between centralized and hybrid models. Since hybrid 
governance structures are a mix between centralized and decentralized structures, it is safe to 
assume that the hybrid model is performing close to that of the centralized model because of its 
centralized tendencies. This means that ultimately, the entire cybersecurity governance structure 
does not have to be centralized.  
Interviews 
 The interviews proved beneficial as they clarified the cybersecurity governance stance of 
each of the 12 states. The data did not always match up with the NCSR data; however, it did 
give a personal glimpse into what each state cybersecurity leader is doing in their attempt to 
initiate a collaborative cybersecurity governance framework at the state level. Using frequency 
tabulations, the states were broken down by cybersecurity governance model used. Five of the 
states interviewed (Tennessee, Michigan, Illinois, Virginia, and North Dakota) use a 
centralized cybersecurity governance framework; four use a decentralized approach (North 
Carolina, Texas, Florida, and Mississippi); three have adopted a hybrid model (New Jersey, 
Hawaii, and New Hampshire). The consensus was that all of the states would like to employ a 
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centralized model; however, that is not always possible because of state culture, resources and 
funding, and lack of a competent workforce. The interviews found that states with close 
relationships to the governor’s office had a better handle on their cybersecurity governance. All 
of the centralized states had the support of senior leadership, as did most of the hybrid states. 
Eight of the 12 states had senior leadership involvement. The cybersecurity governance model 
used was also a contributing factor in the state cybersecurity leader’s perceived success of their 
state’s cybersecurity governance model and program. Six out of 12 states believed that their 
state’s cybersecurity programs are successful (all of the centralized states and one hybrid). A 
few of the states came out and said that their governance programs are not successful because 
of the governance model the state uses. In those instances, the interviewees said that state 
culture and politics dictate their cybersecurity. The five states that use a centralized governance 
structure for cybersecurity alluded to having great success, with room for improvement. (See 
Appendix C for extended findings of all 12 state interviews).  
 The top four states with the highest NCSR scores are categorized as operating from a 
centralized cybersecurity governance model. The states (Tennessee, Michigan, Illinois and 
Virginia) have very little difference in their degree of centralization. All admitted to being 
centralized in the interviews with some sort of central network operating throughout the state. 
Note that the interviewees were not always the same person who answered the NCSR survey; 
in most cases they should have been because they know the most about the governance 
approaches in question. If the same person answered both the NCSR and the interviews, all 
answers and cybersecurity governance models implemented at the state level should have been 
consistent; that was not always the case. 
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Table 15 
Average NCSR Scores for States Interviewed by Governance Model (from high to low) 
State Governance 
Model 
Average 
NCSR Score 
Perceived 
Success 
Governor/Leadership 
Involvement 
Tennessee  Centralized 6.27 Y Y 
Michigan Centralized 5.63 Y Y 
Illinois Centralized 5.36 Y Y 
Virginia Centralized 4.80 Y Y 
North Dakota Centralized 4.79 Y Y 
New Jersey Hybrid 4.44 N N 
Hawaii Hybrid 4.41 N Y 
New Hampshire Hybrid 4.37 Y Y 
North Carolina Decentralized 5.50 N Y 
Texas Decentralized 5.32 N N 
Florida Decentralized 3.00 N N 
Mississippi Decentralized 2.12 N N 
Average  4.67   
Note. Governance model is representative of how the interviewee identified the state. Average 
NCSR scores were pulled from the 2018 NCSR data. 
Study Limitations 
Limitations to this study include the fact that only 12 of the 50 states were represented by 
cybersecurity leaders in these interviews. A larger group of interviewees might have provided 
different results. Another limitation is that many of the states might not have the capability to 
operate from their ideal model. This can be due to budgetary constraints, state culture, lack of 
resources, etc.  
 Limitations may also be present in the person that answered the NCSR survey. It is not 
known who ultimately answered the survey questions; it could have been answered by a state 
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CISO, or it could have been someone that was assigned to answer the survey. This person might 
not have a clear understanding of their state’s cybersecurity governance model. If they do not 
have sufficient knowledge or authority over cybersecurity, then their answers may not be correct. 
Another issue might be their definition and understanding of the term “cybersecurity 
governance.” To mitigate this issue in the interviews, participants were asked what cybersecurity 
governance meant to them. For the most part, there was a clear understanding, though some 
states had more responsibilities and more authority over cybersecurity than others depending on 
the model that was being implemented. There were a few states that answered the NCSR and the 
interview question regarding governance models inconsistently. On the NCSR, North Carolina 
identified as hybrid, yet the state cybersecurity representative said they are decentralized during 
the interviews. North Dakota also had different data claiming to be hybrid on the NCSR and 
centralized/unified in the CIS/CTG interview. New Hampshire said they were centralized on the 
NCSR and hybrid on the interviews, and Mississippi claimed to be hybrid on the survey and 
decentralized in the interviews. Another major limitation could be the number of questions on 
the NCSR. Participants ranked their cybersecurity posture on the five NIST functions, 23 
categories, and 108 subcategories. Fatigue could affect some of the results. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
Threats to cybersecurity are ever-present and ever-changing; they are organizational risks 
that must be managed by state leadership. While every state has cybersecurity programs (offices, 
standards, guidebooks, procedures, and incident response plans), not all states have cybersecurity 
governance measures in place that protect their cyber assets from threats. Essential governance 
mechanisms in the form of frameworks and models are necessary for understanding and 
managing cybersecurity risk; they are also important for translating awareness about cyber 
threats into action. A good governance model that is implemented and supported could mean the 
difference between a successful or a thwarted attack (Pardo, et al., 2020, p. 5). 
This dissertation examined three different cybersecurity governance models (centralized, 
decentralized, and hybrid) at the state level with the purpose of answering the research question: 
Is a centralized cybersecurity governance model the most successful (effective and efficient) 
framework and can this model/framework be successfully implemented at the state level? This 
research also aimed to test the hypothesis that states with centralized authority over cybersecurity 
governance will have higher NCSR scores (higher scores = more successful cybersecurity 
programs) than states that utilize a decentralized or hybrid model.  
The research examined state level Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) data, 
where high NCSR scores (on a one to seven-point Likert scale) represented more successful 
cybersecurity programs. Forty-three states participated in the 2018 NCSR; collectively, states 
that practiced centralized authority over their cybersecurity governance did have higher scores 
than those that followed a decentralized or hybrid model of governance (MS-ISAC, 2018). 
However, there were some exceptions and instances where a hybrid model was more effective 
for some states.  
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Additionally, the study compared NCSR governance data and data collected through 12 
telephone interviews with individuals responsible in some way for cybersecurity in their states. 
Again, the consensus was that states that had a centralized level of cybersecurity governance 
deemed their programs more effective. The majority of the states acknowledged that a 
centralized cybersecurity model of governance was the ideal model; however, many of the 
interviewees stated that there are obstacles standing in the way of achieving centralized 
governance within their state. 
All 12 states helped provide a better understanding of cybersecurity governance as a 
whole. While each state responded differently to most of the questions, there were major themes 
across the board. From the 12 telephone interviews with state cybersecurity leadership, seven 
major themes emerged: cybersecurity risks, leadership involvement (governor and legislature), 
scope of authority, statutes and laws, branches of government affected by cybersecurity 
governance, training and education, and budgets/procurements. 
There are many risks to a state’s cybersecurity efforts. It could just be the culture or 
identity of the state, or it could be that many leaders and employees do not know the risks 
associated with cybersecurity. Generally, the risks are the same across the board for all states 
regardless of model used. They are the things that are plaguing state agencies: ransomware, 
hackers, phishing emails, etc. Some states do not have appropriate standards, or have no 
consolidated view; there is no threat landscape, aggregation, or there is a lack of transparency. 
There might be inadequate funding at both the state and local level which results in the lack of 
basic cyber hygiene. There could simply be too many systems in place. The state of Virginia’s 
(centralized) representative said that their greatest threat to cybersecurity efforts is insider threat 
and access control. New Hampshire’s (hybrid) greatest cybersecurity risk is malicious code 
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coming through email. New Hampshire’s cybersecurity leader said “the threat is wide and 
broad.” (CIS Interviews, 2019). Under a decentralized model, Texas says keeping data 
confidential is a risk they see in the state; another risk is ransomware. North Carolina sees their 
greatest risks as inconsistencies and the way they defend against the cyber attacker (CIS 
Interviews, 2019). 
Leadership involvement is important for cybersecurity governance at the state level. 
Executive buy-in and advocacy can go a long way to ensuring a cyber program is successful. 
Only three of the 12 states interviewed said the governor does not support their cybersecurity 
initiatives. Two of those states were hybrid and one was decentralized. The governor of North 
Dakota (centralized) is a big advocate for cybersecurity initiatives having been at Microsoft 
before his tenure; “he looks to reinvent government, reinvent security, reinvent cyber, and so 
on,” (CIS Interviews, 2019). Many states have leadership teams from the governor down that are 
dedicated to the mission of cybersecurity. Sometimes a governor can have conflicting views on 
cybersecurity and different priorities than the person responsible for cybersecurity in their state, 
as is the case in Hawaii where the governor is a very strong proponent of open data. The state is 
opening up some of their financial systems and releasing some of the data. However, there is a 
conflict because that information can be used against them (CIS Interviews, 2019). 
Most states are trying to reach a “whole-of-state” governance approach, putting the 
citizens first. This is bigger than IT and cybersecurity, and it is not always possible. All 12 of the 
states interviewed said they would like to be able to do more for local government; however, it 
does not fall within their scope of responsibility. While the State of Michigan (centralized) does 
not have authority over local government, protecting and helping local government is still 
important. The representative from Michigan stated that “since government is not customer 
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service oriented, he has to really work hard to make ends meet.” Tennessee (centralized) has a 
newly elected governor and staff, and there is an initiative to do more around cybersecurity as a 
whole, including at the local level. The local government, cities, and counties are struggling right 
now around cybersecurity and IT, so Tennessee is hopeful that new initiatives will be able to 
bridge the gap (CIS Interviews, 2019). In North Carolina (decentralized), there is no 
cybersecurity committee or governing body outside of the state CISO’s office; cybersecurity 
leadership believes this would be beneficial as it would pull in various elements that are not 
being taken into consideration at the time being. North Carolina would also like to have 
representatives from academia, the private sector, and state and local government in a 
consolidated group to help make decisions for a whole-of-state approach (CIS Interviews, 2019). 
There are many ways to put citizens first – collaboratively, collectively, and 
authoritatively. In order to do this, executive sponsorship is needed. The governor’s job is to 
protect the state, not the state agencies. One way to do this is through statutes, laws, and 
executive orders. All 12 state’s cybersecurity initiatives and programs are codified by law in 
some respect; the only exception is New Hampshire where cybersecurity is not transcribed in 
law, though information technology (IT) is. In New Hampshire, cybersecurity falls under IT (CIS 
Interviews, 2019). With that being said, these laws generally cover the executive branch of 
government only. However, in Tennessee it covers executive, judicial, and legislative branch 
agencies, and in North Dakota, their seven branches of government (executive, judicial, 
legislative, K-12 and higher education, city, county, and local government) are covered (CIS 
Interviews, 2019). 
Training and education, and the budget (lack thereof) are major themes that can stop a 
cybersecurity governance program in its tracks. All 12 states have cybersecurity training 
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initiatives in place; some are more complex than others. Florida (decentralized) trains cyber 
professionals in state government and works closely with DHS and the National Guard on 
training initiatives. Most states provide cybersecurity awareness training every year to their 
employees. Educating the workforce is important, to include the sitting workforce and new 
workforce that needs to be recruited – IT workforce, society, leadership, etc. In Hawaii, the 
biggest issue the state is having right now is procurement and adequate staffing; neither are there 
(CIS Interviews, 2019). Funding is critical and Illinois’ cybersecurity governance representative 
says that the procurement cycle moves slow; it is never fast enough. Some states like Michigan 
and North Dakota (both centralized) have an adequate staff and sufficient budgets; however, not 
every state is so lucky. Budgeting in Mississippi is completely decentralized, and “looking at the 
state as a whole, all of the individual agencies lack resources and people that are dedicated to 
implementing security,” (CIS Interviews, 2019). 
Through the interviews, it was discovered that governance is not necessarily well 
understood and commonly defined, and that no one model is best – not centralized, not 
decentralized, and not hybrid. However, centralized, decentralized, and hybrid are relevant when 
talking about the executive branch; for cyber resilience of the state, this is not enough. The state 
as a whole is outside of this distinction. In a perfect world, most of the state representatives 
interviewed would like to have a centralized model of governance. Funding, resources, 
personnel, and state culture are deterring a centralized approach in many of the states. Having 
governance models in place is necessary to manage cybersecurity risk, but it is not always 
sufficient. There should be governance power over procurement – meaning control over funding 
and procurement, decisions about who has to meet the standards, and their roles and 
responsibilities. The states interviewed said that cybersecurity governance needs to be bigger 
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than the executive branch of the state government and should cover other agencies such as K-12, 
local government, and nonprofits.  
There are many enablers for a state’s cyber efforts. These include procurement control in 
order to have effective cyber governance, control of the network, and legislation in the form of 
statutes and administrative code. While the majority of the states interviewed would ideally like 
to have a centralized model of governance, four of them have a federated, or decentralized model 
– a model that will most likely stay that way because of state identity, local power, etc. These 
states include: Florida, Mississippi, Texas, and North Carolina. The governors of each state also 
face practical realities when it comes to cybersecurity and cybersecurity governance: they cannot 
always hire the best and brightest; some people do not want to work in the public sector; there is 
a lack of trust in the government; technology is constantly changing, as are the nature of threats 
to technology; and, there is a high turnover rate of CISOs and CIOs. There may be a limited 
amount of time a governor will be in power, so thinking about sustainable cybersecurity 
strategies is important.  
Which Model is Best? 
The coupling of a central authority and decentralized, or invisible control compliance, has 
allowed cybersecurity in its current state to either be a flip of a coin or wishful thinking from the 
perspective of the upper legislature in government. While most states have some form of 
cybersecurity governance, it often lacks sufficient power to compel compliance with the standard 
policies and procedures that are required to systematically manage risks. Some states have weak 
or missing authority to establish the interagency, and increasingly the intergovernmental and 
inter-sectoral, agreements that are necessary to formalize collaborations. 
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At the highest level, there are certain requirements that a governance program should 
follow. These include: 
1. Leadership and vision are communicated through the hierarchy.  
 
2. Training and development is available for governance across all levels of state 
government. 
 
3. Collaboration – a siloed approach – has not provided the required results especially 
given the need to react and respond at more granular levels within all agencies 
throughout state government. 
 
4. Cost – not only financial, but the cost of adhering to the governance framework – can 
this need be justified and bought across all levels?  
 
5. Risk appreciation – for governance to have substance, risk must be calculated and 
controlled. The decisions being made should be based on an analysis of risk and 
aligned to providing information across organizations in order to categorize, analyze, 
and understand the risks that each level faces. If a complete appreciation of risk 
across government is not known, then the cost of adherence is not attributed to the 
right control cost center. 
 
6. Feedback, in the ability to govern in this century – the requirement must be to 
appreciate the risk through constant feedback. Risks in cybersecurity are constantly 
changing; reaction and risk appreciation at higher levels of state government need to 
react and provide the collaborative assistance to understand the need and respond in 
kind.  
 
Securing public cybersecurity systems is a complex and critical issue. Across the U.S., 
many states are investing in initiatives to address this complex problem by establishing 
governance structures that ensure that cybersecurity decision-making mechanisms are well-
defined and in place. These initiatives also ensure that risks to security are well understood and 
approaches to reducing risks are appropriate, sufficient, and follow industry standards.  
Certain aspects of cybersecurity governance at the state level should be centralized, while 
some are open to fragmentation. While the most hyper centralized model may not be the ideal 
framework for cybersecurity governance, there clearly is a degree of centralization that needs to 
be enforced for cybersecurity, specifically so that each state governor can express their direction 
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and facilitate efficient communication with crucial stakeholders related to the success of the 
state’s cybersecurity. Increased fragmentation leads to increased difficulty for security.  
The results of the 2018 NCSR data analysis conclude that relatively higher scores and 
averages are seen in states that practice a centralized model/framework of cybersecurity 
governance, with a few exceptions. NCSR scores were significantly higher for centralized states 
compared to decentralized states; and, NCSR scores were significantly higher for states that 
utilized a hybrid model of cybersecurity governance as compared to a decentralized model. 
There was no significant difference between centralized and hybrid cybersecurity governance 
models used at the state level. Since hybrid governance structures are a mix between centralized 
and decentralized structures, one can assume that the hybrid model is performing close to that of 
the centralized model because of its centralized tendencies.  
Most of the states interviewed in this study see a centralized model as being the ideal 
cybersecurity governance model. However, there are obstacles standing in the way of 
centralization. The North Carolina cybersecurity leader classified the state as very decentralized 
in nature in the interviews, however they are pushing the state in a centralized direction, as they 
believe it is the optimal governance structure for the state given proper resources and personnel. 
Hawaii, while it wants to move towards a centralized model, currently tackles things on a more 
decentralized basis due to lack of manpower and funding. Hawaii is hoping to transform the 
culture surrounding cybersecurity governance in order to move in a more unified direction. The 
CISO has authority to govern cybersecurity throughout the state, and this is defined in statute. 
North Dakota’s unified nature of its seven branches of government or “Stage Net” approach to 
cybersecurity governance pushes it into the centralized as opposed to hybrid category as 
displayed in the NCSR data. The fact that one shared network provides visibility into the seven 
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branches at one time enables a more centralized approach by capturing and analyzing 
information coming across at that level. Texas and Florida will likely remain decentralized due 
to size and political climate respectively (as stated in their interviews). They largely believe that 
a decentralized approach for them will continue long into the future as other parts of their 
respective government’s organization take after this approach. 
Even states that say they are operating from a completely centralized approach, apply 
some form of decentralization in more of a hybrid manner. The aspects that are open to 
decentralization should include some common expectations/considerations that are key to 
implementing an effective decentralized system that minimizes communication breakdowns and 
confusion within chains of command. By taking this approach, it is fair to say that no one 
governance model is “the perfect model.” Looking at different examples from the NCSR data, 
the interviews conducted, and drawing the conclusion of “this is where centralization excels” and 
“this is where decentralization can excel, but this is what you (governor) should put in place to 
insure it does” is key to this study.  
States must execute their governance to ensure they are ready to understand new threats 
and plan and execute new risk management strategies. Expansion from executive level agency 
assets, to a “whole of state” perspective that engages stakeholders from across levels of 
government and sectors in a collaborative process of risk management is increasingly recognized 
as the key to managing cybersecurity risks. This expansion does not have to happen all at once; it 
may be reflected in governance that evolves from predictable and stable funding, to funding that 
is commensurate to the state’s position with respect to actual measured risk. In some states, such 
adaptation may mean expanding authority to controlling IT procurement; in other states it may 
mean expanding the scope of authority beyond state government or building collaborations that 
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lead to joint agreements about how cybersecurity threats will be managed across levels of 
government and sectors. In many cases, it will lead to both. An ongoing commitment to 
cybersecurity governance is critical and it must be adaptable as new threats evolve. 
Cybersecurity governance at the state level should be founded on a broader, state enterprise 
effort. This effort not only ensures that agencies are on the same page when responding to 
incidents, but establishes a sense of cross-functionality and unity around the fact that 
cybersecurity is not just a governance problem, but a public problem.  
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Appendix A: Sample Email Sent to Interview Candidate States 
Dear XXXX, 
The annual Nationwide Cybersecurity Review (NCSR) has documented that most state and local 
organizations are assessed below the recommended minimum grade for cybersecurity. Moreover, 
most states have made slow progress in improving their cybersecurity resiliency. Surveys of state 
CIOs and CISOs have identified weak IT governance as a contributing factor, often resulting 
from diffused authority and complex organization structures. A number of states have addressed 
this challenge through effective cybersecurity governance and can serve as reference models for 
others.  
The Center for Internet Security (CIS) and the Center for Technology in Government (CTG) at 
the University of Albany, State University of New York, are partnering on the development of a 
document for state government leaders that will draw on these leading practices. The document 
will guide states in their efforts to improve their cybersecurity. 
Given your experience in cybersecurity governance, we are writing to invite you to contribute to 
this guidance document by participating in an interview about cybersecurity governance in your 
state. Your insights regarding the drivers and foundational structure for cybersecurity governance 
will ensure that the guidance document reflects the insights of leading practitioners.  
We are targeting the week of September 16th to conduct the interviews. Interviews will be 
conducted over the phone and last about 60 minutes.  
If you are able to participate, we will work with you or your point of contact to schedule the 
interview and to answer any questions you may have about the project and the interview. 
Thank you in advance for considering our invitation to share your insights and experiences as we 
work to inform senior executives across the country about the importance of effective 
cybersecurity governance to increase cybersecurity resiliency. 
Best regards, 
 
John Gilligan 
President and CEO 
Center for Internet Security 
 
 
Theresa A. Pardo, Ph.D. 
Director 
CTG UAlbany 
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Appendix B: Cybersecurity Governance Framework Project Interview Protocol 
Cybersecurity Governance 
Project Directors: 
John Gilligan, Center for Internet Security, John.Gilligan@cisecurity.org 
Dr. Theresa A. Pardo, CTG UAlbany, tpardo@ctg.albany.edu 
 
Interviews will be led by one lead participant from CIS and one from CTG UAlbany. 
Introduction by CIS lead 
✓ Good morning, my name is _______. I am a _______ with the Center for Internet 
Security (CIS) here in East Greenbush, New York. I’m joined here by ___________. 
_____ is with the Center for Technology in Government at the University at Albany, our 
partner in this project. 
✓ As you may recall from our invitation letter, this interview is part of a larger project 
focused on creating guidance for top-level state officials on cybersecurity governance. 
Our interview with you is an important component of this project as we believe the 
guidance we produce will benefit greatly from your experiences and opinions. As noted 
in the invitation, the interview will take up to 1 hour. 
✓ Thank you for taking the time to talk with us, we are very grateful.  
 
✓ Before we start, I’d like to review our data collection and use approach. We generally 
audio record interviews so that we have a full record of the session for analysis purposes.  
 
✓ In terms of data use, the recording from today’s interview will be kept confidential and 
general findings will be presented in an aggregated way. If we want to use a direct quote 
from your interview, we will contact you for approval. No information associated with 
your identity will be revealed without your permission.  
✓ If you agree to being recorded, we will turn on the recording now.  
✓ Do you have any questions before we begin the interview? 
✓ I will now turn to ___________who will lead us through the questions in the interview. 
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Warm Up (WU) 
First, we’re going to start by getting a little bit of information about your background and your 
daily work.  
WU_1. Can you give me a brief description of your job [title] and major 
[responsibilities/activities]? [Note: keep this brief as time is limited. Emphasis areas bolded.] 
Prompts ✓ How long have you worked in the area of cybersecurity?  
✓ Did you work in any other government agencies or roles before this one? 
✓ Professional and education background 
✓ Current position  
✓ Major responsibilities 
WU_2. In your opinion, what is the greatest risk to cybersecurity in your state? 
Prompts ✓ … 
 
Current Practice (CP) 
Our project aims to understand the nature of cybersecurity governance at the state level. First, we 
would like to hear about how cybersecurity is governed in your state now.  
CP_1. Please describe your state’s approach to governing cybersecurity. [This is the most 
important question for the interview. Several of the prompts my not be covered in the 
response but will be addressed in follow up questions (see bold items). Alternatively, the 
follow up questions may not be necessary. ] 
 
Prompts ✓ How is accountability assigned and measured/assessed? 
✓ Involvement of top-level IT leadership and agency leadership 
✓ How is impact of cybersecurity governance determined and tracked?  
✓ What functions does governance include? [Budget, policy, technical standards, 
procurement, personnel development, etc.] 
✓ Is it codified in law? 
✓ What decisions are made?  
✓ Who is involved? 
✓ Who is in charge? 
✓ Who has what authority? 
✓ What processes are used? 
✓ Limitations of the governance approach 
✓ Relationship to IT governance? 
✓ Involvement of the private sector and local government? 
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CP_2. Some states have highly centralized cybersecurity governance; others have 
decentralized and some have hybrid approaches. How would you describe the model that 
your state uses? 
Prompts ✓ How does the (centralized, decentralized, hybrid) governance model work? 
✓ Is it documented, and can we get a copy  
✓ Why was this model implemented? 
✓ What do you perceive to be the Strengths and weaknesses of this approach for 
your state? 
CP_3. Can you describe how the current approach developed or evolved? 
Prompts ✓ When did the current model get put in place? 
✓ What were the most critical decisions that led to this approach and why was the 
current approach selected? 
✓ What are the benefits of the current approach over the previous approach? 
✓ Whose advice, if any, did you follow in selecting this approach? 
 
 
Critical Success Factors (CSFs) 
 
In this section, I’m going to ask you a few questions about the factors that you believe have 
contributed to the success or lack of success of your current approach to cybersecurity 
governance. You can answer to the best of your knowledge, or just share your opinions with us. 
CSF_1. What factors have been critical to your efforts to increase cybersecurity resilience in 
your state? 
Prompts ✓ Clear articulation of policy? 
✓ Strong Advocate/Executive Champion? 
✓ Clarity of Roles and responsibilities? 
✓ Who makes the most difference – individuals or specific groups? 
✓ Management? 
✓ Technology? 
✓ Key Actors? 
✓ Key Partnerships? 
✓ An incident that proved to be a catalyst? 
✓ Informal and formal leaders? 
✓ Transparency 
✓ Accountability 
 
CSF_2. Has the scope of your cybersecurity governance contributed to your cybersecurity 
resilience (that is, to what extent has your cybersecurity governance been a significant factor 
in improving cybersecurity resilience)?  
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Prompts ✓ Does it include the private sector? 
✓ Does it include local governments? 
✓ Does it extend to protecting individuals?  
✓ Others?  
 
Role of Advocates (RA) 
RA_1. Who is the most influential advocate for cybersecurity in your state?  
Prompts ✓ Is that person also an advocate for cybersecurity governance?  
RA_2. How has this person (or persons) impacted or influenced groups such as the CISO, the 
budget office, and the legislature, among other public and private organizations? 
Prompts ✓ To what extent  
✓ In what ways 
 
Role of Key Actors (D) 
In this section, I’m going to ask you a few questions about the role that top executives (i.e. 
agency heads, CIO, you, etc.) played in your current approach to cybersecurity governance in 
your state. You can answer to the best of your knowledge, or just share your opinions with us. 
D_1. How have top executives in your state participated in the creation of or been impacted by 
cybersecurity governance?  
Prompts ✓ … 
D_2. What has been the most significant action taken by your state that increased your state’s 
cybersecurity?  
Prompts ✓ … 
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Results and Benefits (RB) 
In this section, I would like to focus on the results and benefits of cybersecurity governance you 
have referred to before. 
RB_1. What benefits do you see from your state’s cybersecurity governance investments?  
Prompts ✓ Reduced? 
✓ No impact? 
✓ Surprises? 
RB_2. What indicators do you use to track the benefits of cybersecurity governance?  
 
Prompts ✓  
RB_3. How well is your cybersecurity governance helping your state address its most significant 
cybersecurity challenges?  
Prompts ✓ Areas for improvement in your approach? 
 
RB_4. In your opinion, is your state’s approach to cybersecurity governance a success?  
Prompts ✓ Why? 
✓ In what way? 
✓ More effective and efficient? 
 
Recommendations for Action (RA) ****Leave at least 5 – 10 minutes at the end of interview 
for these questions. 
 
In this section, I will ask you to share your recommendations for governors and other key leaders 
regarding creating/improving cybersecurity governance in their state. 
RA_1. What is the # 1 action you would recommend to any governor (or other senior 
executive) seeking to increase cybersecurity and cyber resiliency in their state?  
Prompts ✓ New policy? 
✓ New money? 
✓ People? 
✓ Why this action? 
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Conclusion (C) 
C_1. As we close out, please tell me if there is anything I should have asked you that I didn’t – 
something for example, that is key or unique to your state’s cybersecurity governance 
approach or successes? 
Prompts ✓ Collaboration with local government 
✓ Collaboration with other organizations 
✓ Resources 
✓ Willingness and commitment 
✓ Timing? 
✓ … 
 
End/Thanks 
✓ Thank you. I’ll now turn it over to ____________ from CIS who will close out our 
conversation. 
✓ Would it be OK to follow up and clarify a few things with you in the future if necessary? 
✓ Thank you very much for your time. 
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Appendix C: State Interviews – Summary by State 
Florida: The representative from Florida identified the state’s cybersecurity governance 
model as that of a primarily decentralized model, though there are aspects that are hybrid. The 
office of the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is responsible for the executive branch 
agencies in a fairly decentralized model in terms of the way he manages it. The CISO advises the 
governor’s office on all matters cyber, and also does a lot in terms of training cyber professionals 
in state government, working closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 
National Guard. The CISO’s office also manages the security operations team and data center, 
which supports most of the state agencies. Engaging leadership is a challenge for Florida, as is 
getting the buy-in that is needed in order to accomplish the cyber mission. Financial support is 
lacking, as are the personnel that they are able to engage for cyber and state government. 
Changing technology is another risk as the state is always trying to play catch up. Other risks 
include ransomware and their own users clicking on links that they are not supposed to. 
Local governments often reach out to the state for support and while they do not have the 
formal authority over local government and are not within scope, they do try to support them 
where they can. With a new governor in place now that sees the importance of cybersecurity, 
helping at the local level is easier. It also gives cybersecurity leadership an easier time to present 
to legislators. Florida has recently created a cyber-task force, headed by the Lieutenant Governor 
and includes a lot of high-level appointees. There is a statue that speaks to the CISO’s authority 
and to the authority of the department for cyber and state government, known as the Security 
Act. The state also has Florida Administrative Code based on the cybersecurity framework.  
The State of Florida CISO’s office engages with other state agencies on a regular basis; 
each agency has an Information Security Manager who runs the agency’s security programs. In a 
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decentralized model, serving on boards has broadened the scope of this role. The cyber task force 
has opened up many recommendations which will likely lead to additional resources in terms of 
personnel and additional statute and bills to support cyber efforts. The CISO’s office has a 
recurring budget for operations, their data center, and engaging the university system; they also 
have a legislative budget request every year for big ticket issues that need to be addressed over 
the coming year. Florida is looking to start a centralized Security Operations Center as well. The 
office of the CISO has been able to influence the administrative code related to how purchasing 
is done, though is not directly involved in other agencies.  
In Florida, most agencies are primarily responsible for their own IT and cyber needs, 
making it a decentralized state. The CISO does have some influence over other agencies through 
administrative code; representatives from the office consult with them on a regular basis. 
However, being part of the conservative South affects governance as they follow the mantra “do 
more with less,” (CIS Interviews, 2019). There is pretty much zero interest in increasing the 
workforce, which can be problematic. Decentralization is attributed to the climate of Florida and 
how Florida chooses to operate. The interviewee sees decentralization as a weakness as it comes 
down to some really basic concepts. Florida is hoping to one day be more centralized and 
standardized when it comes to security aspects of cyber. 
Tennessee. The representative for the State of Tennessee says that the biggest threat to 
cybersecurity in his state is the loss of data of the citizens and losing the competence of the 
citizens that they provide services to. He wants the citizens to know what the state is doing as a 
whole to protect their data. To combat that issue, they have a risk and compliance program in 
place. Tennessee operates from a centralized cybersecurity governance framework and has 
authority over people and policy at the enterprise level. They also have governance over 
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vulnerability management, patch management, and end of life type devices. They scan all of 
their servers every week through their data center, and all of the state agencies have the ability to 
go in and see what their vulnerabilities look like. They also track those vulnerabilities and help 
the agencies mitigate them in a timely manner. Tennessee has a lot of review processes in place 
as well to ensure their governance is working. The state follows laws and mandates given to 
them by the Information Systems Council. 
There are limitations to Tennessee’s cyber governance structure in that they are only 
looking at the executive, judicial, and legislative branch agencies. However, the state has a new 
governor and staff, and there is an initiative to do more around cybersecurity as a whole 
including at the local level. The interviewee says that the local government, cities, and counties 
are struggling right now around cybersecurity and IT, so he is hopeful that new initiatives will be 
able to bridge the gap (CIS Interviews, 2019). 
There are advantage and disadvantages to Tennessee’s very centralized network. A 
strength is that they are able to make changes across the board very quickly. They are able to 
leverage their partnerships and write custom signatures, and then push that out to forty-thousand 
devices that they manage through a centralized management tool. As far as a con, it is said that 
they may not move as fast as some of the agencies want them to, and are not able to develop 
solutions that they think that they have a business need for. Cost efficiency is another issue they 
are dealing with especially with moving to the Cloud. The State of Tennessee has strong 
executive champions and partners, and even stronger executive buy-in. They also have a 
vulnerability program and applications assessments in place, along with strong security 
awareness programs mandating that every state employee has cybersecurity awareness training 
every year. 
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North Dakota. Cybersecurity decision-makers for the State of North Dakota say the 
biggest threats to cybersecurity in the state are the inconsistencies and the way they defend 
against the cyber attacker. The state has seven branches of government: executive, judicial, 
legislative, K-12 and higher education, city, county, and local government. They operate from a 
unified (centralized) approach and have one shared network out to all of these entities across the 
state. They have visibility into everything at a network level across the entire state, giving them 
the ability to capture, protect, and look at the information coming across at a network layer, and 
make sure that the state as a whole is protected. This makes the State of North Dakota quite 
unique in respect to other state’s cyber governance initiatives. They cover 400+ entities, and 
potentially those 400+ entities could have 400+ different ways of doing things. This simplifies 
the process.  
Recently, the state initiated a bill called Senate Bill 21-10 which gives the CISO’s office 
the ability to align cybersecurity needs across all seven branches of government both from a 
strategy standpoint and an operational standpoint. The governor is a big advocate for the 
initiative having been at Microsoft before his tenure and wants to reinvent government, reinvent 
security, reinvent cyber, and so on. Cybersecurity decisions are made by advisory boards, task 
forces, and governance processes with $11.4 million dollars set aside for cyber and workforce. 
The state CISO’s office collaborates to advise and oversee the other entities, giving the state a 
common way of managing cybersecurity through metrics, maturity levels, etc. It is easier to 
manage because the state is so small. Operational aspects can be seen as a weakness, as there is 
not always buy-in at the local level. “Setting a strategy is easy; delivering on that strategy – not 
so much,” (CIS Interviews, 2019). The entire state is connected; it is the clash of the new and 
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old. Securing of new information is not a new problem; the unevenness in protectedness is the 
problem (CIS Interviews, 2019).  
While many of the states interviewed referred to North Dakota’s unified cybersecurity 
governance as the ideal model, state cybersecurity leadership disagreed. He reiterated the fact 
that there is no one size fits all when it comes to governance. There is a whole set of unique 
characteristics across the states – need mechanisms that take advantage of culture, cost, structure 
of government, etc.  
New Jersey. The New Jersey Cybersecurity and Communications Integration office was 
created by an executive order in 2015 to be the state’s one-stop-shop for cybersecurity, 
information sharing, threat intelligence, best practices, incident reporting, and incident response. 
The organization works in a public-private partnership with all organizations: small businesses, 
large businesses, academia, public sector, etc. The state’s biggest risk to cybersecurity is the 
whole of state approach in a highly centralized model. Previously it was hybrid, but recent 
changes have made most of the state centralized. Government does not deem cybersecurity in 
New Jersey as high priority, leaving some programs somewhat hybrid. 
Cybersecurity for the State of New Jersey is organized under the office of Homeland 
Security and Preparedness. It is not under the office of Information Technology as is the case 
with other states. It is done in a holistic manner. Each major state agency has personnel that they 
are responsible for and cybersecurity within that respective agency. Budgeting takes place within 
those agency budgets; they are specific to the agency and not global across all agencies. Under 
the Department of Homeland Security, New Jersey has a cybersecurity budget that is based on 
the enterprise protective technologies that were purchased on behalf of the state. Decisions on 
governance are made at the governor and board level. There is also an information security 
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governance committee that is comprised of commissioners and agency heads that work on bigger 
policy issues. Resources and allocations of resources are limitations here; as are increases in the 
number of services, but no increases or changes to the budget. Under this plan there is no 
involvement of local government of any size in how decisions, or what decisions are made. 
The state has identified factors that have been critical to its efforts to increase 
cybersecurity resilience: incident response, cybersecurity awareness training, reporting of 
incidents, etc. Also of importance in the new centralized governance structure is that policies and 
standards are impacting overall security as they are being implemented; in the past there was no 
requirement for it and nobody did it. The state still has a lot of vulnerabilities that are not being 
patched, but those are some of the things that they are focusing on in order to say that they are 
improving. New Jersey’s representative thinks that more needs to be done on information sharing 
between the states in regard to governance. This state in particular said their governance 
approach is not yet a success, as they are still building the program. Success would come in the 
form of understanding the risk, and being able to mitigate those risks to the best of their ability. 
Texas. The Republic of Texas’s cybersecurity governance initiatives are run from a 
decentralized or federated model. There are 150 state agencies and institutions of higher 
education that make up the state and each has their own IT associated with it. Each organization 
is responsible for their own data system and their own security. The Texas CISO and others at 
the state level set policy and provide education and guidance. There is also a statewide data 
center that is outsourced, so there is a security component over that as well. 
Keeping data confidential is a risk in Texas; another risk is ransomware. It is mainly 
happening at the local level and those at the state level are assisting with that endeavor through 
training programs and a statewide incident response plan that was developed through the Texas 
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Division of Emergency Management. The CISO’s office has formal authority over the 150 
agencies and institutions, but engages through agreements and collaborations, and through other 
legislation such as training with non-state executive agency entities. The office has no authority 
over local government and there is no legislation that says they have to follow state policies; the 
locals want local control.  
Funding is also a big issue in Texas. Each agency is self-funded through a cooperative 
contract. The Department of Information Resources provides telecommunications services to the 
other organizations and they get a percentage of every purchase made; they also get a percentage 
of money for use of their data center services and receive general revenue funds from the state. 
In order to make changes to law, they can make recommendations to the legislature and the 
legislature can change law that Texas has authority over. The agency is ultimately responsible 
for the security of IT and provides assessment services, but again has no authority over 
compliance; that is done with internal audits and the auditor’s office within each agency. 
However, every two years they must deliver a cyber-report to the legislature based on maturity 
levels of operational and security strategies. 
The CISO’s office does have governance over the data center; it is a very mature 
governance structure through a shared technology service. They utilize a business counsel and IQ 
leadership – a leadership group at the top. From an operational perspective cyber governance is 
very decentralized in the State of Texas, but with all of the boards and legislation governance is 
somewhat more centralized, making it somewhat of a hybrid structure. Cybersecurity issues are 
reported to a board that is appointed by the governor.  
Virginia. Virginia is very unique when it comes to cybersecurity governance. Virginia 
runs and maintains cybersecurity standards for the Commonwealth through a very centralized 
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governance model. The Virginia Information Technology Agency (VITA) creates standards and 
requirements that are built into all of Virginia’s technology services as well as those they 
outsource to. In governance, VITA sets the security standards and requirements for all three 
branches of government. VITA only does the enforcement in the executive branch to maintain 
separation of duties, but does set the standards for everybody in Virginia. Operationally, the 
office runs the security services for over 65 executive branch agencies. The office has authority 
to purchase things from and communicate requirements out to vendors, and has control of 
standards. VITA also has authority over what other agencies purchase and can stop an agency 
from purchasing a piece of equipment if it is not compliant with their standards.  
The greatest threat to Virginia cybersecurity efforts is insider threat and access control, 
which according to the state representative, is being addressed on a daily basis. Virginia has not 
always used a centralized model; however, in order to curb budget inefficiencies where a number 
of agencies had expensive footprints for their technology, they decided to centralize it into one 
single IT agency. VITA undergoes security audits every three years and performs business 
impact analysis. They use a charge back model for the operational arm of cybersecurity; eight 
percent of the billing from the charge back model funds the work of governance programs of the 
agency. The biggest limitations are conflict of interest items which involve both risk and 
operations; VITA believes that risk and operations should be separate. The only time VITA talks 
to the governor’s office is when things are abnormal. Even though Virginia has centralized 
control, it is important for VITA to have a good working relationship with agency Information 
Security Officers. When making recommendations to other states, funding is critical and statutes 
are a driving factor. States that have a better handle on their cybersecurity governance have the 
governor’s ear; visibility is key (CIS Interviews, 2019).  
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Illinois. A representative from the Illinois Department of Innovation and Technology 
(DoIT) was interviewed for this study. In 2003, Illinois had an executive order to centralize IT. 
However, this executive order did not give DoIT centralized oversight of IT as a whole. There 
was a lot of arguing about authority and responsibility. The Y2K coordination helped create a set 
of shared understandings and recognized the value of coordination. With a strong character in the 
role of CISO, things have come together. The centralized cybersecurity governance structure has 
greatly reduced the number and impact of incidents on state systems, greatly reducing the risks 
through formalized processes and procedures. The state’s area of greatest outreach is elections. 
They have nine elections cyber navigators that go out to local elections offices to do risk 
assessments. They use NIST standards for state government and CIS Benchmarks and CIS 
Controls for local governments.  
State statute allows the office of the Chief Information Security Officer to focus on 
implementation and makes it clear who is responsible for strategy. It depoliticizes the issues, but 
still involves executive sponsorship for enforcement and for funding. The CISO’s office has 
authority to shut off systems if there is a breach and agencies must comply. In this centralized 
model, there is still a concern about local government. They are still looking for answers to 
address local government and school districts; it is the CISO’s responsibility. Another issue with 
cybersecurity governance in Illinois is that the procurement cycle moves slow, and that no matter 
how fast they move, it is never fast enough. In Illinois, cybersecurity governance is a business 
problem that involves state and local government and school districts. Collaboration is key, and 
the impact on citizens and the private sector should be considered when making decisions. The 
State of Illinois has a working relationship with the governor. 
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Michigan. Previous interviewees had mentioned the successes of the State of Michigan 
and how they were trying to achieve the same status by following a centralized model. The 
state’s representative shared a lot of insight about the state’s centralized model and why it is so 
successful. The interviewee emphasized that one of the biggest challenges is finding enterprise 
solutions that meet the needs of twenty very discrete, very different customers. The office of the 
CISO manages different state level agencies. The office does not have any say at the local level, 
as local government is decentralized. The representative stated that “since government is not 
customer service oriented, the office has to really work hard to make ends meet,” (CIS 
Interviews, 2019). The State of Michigan has a leadership team from the governor down that is 
dedicated to the mission of cybersecurity. Being centralized at the state level means that the 
CISO has a staff and a sufficient budget that allows the office to be able to start focusing on 
next-order problems. However, the interviewee thinks that the State of Michigan can do a much 
better job planning, and that they should try to think as far in advance as they possibly can. 
Culture was an important theme to the success of Michigan’s centralized governance model, and 
it is important for the CISO’s office to be visible in the public’s eyes. While the State of 
Michigan does not have authority over local government, protecting and helping local 
government is still important. At the state level, cybersecurity is one of the top two or three 
priorities for the governor. Executive sponsorship is important and has increased cybersecurity 
resiliency for Michigan. They attribute that, and their centralized model to the success of the 
governance structure.  
Hawaii. Hawaii operates from a hybrid governance model, and the state representative 
says the state is still trying to figure out how to make it work. There are policies in place 
statewide, but they are very thin and not a single department can meet those requirements. When 
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asked about the greatest risk to cybersecurity in Hawaii, the representative said it is the culture, 
“culture eats strategy, eats technology” (CIS Interviews, 2019). Even with the best strategy, it is 
impossible to win without changing the culture. Organizational silos between the different 
branches have been difficult to break in Hawaii. 
The state CISO’s office is responsible for the security and privacy related strategies; a 
governance officer formally owns the rest, to include: enterprise architecture, identifying 
evergreen initiatives, transforming technologies, and maintaining those technologies moving 
forward. The biggest issue the state is having right now is procurement and adequate staffing. 
Neither are there. Hawaii has different standards and means for IT governance and cyber 
governance. The governor is a very strong proponent of open data and wants to help support the 
initiative. To do that, the state is opening up some of their financial systems and releasing some 
of the information. However, there is a conflict there because that information can be used 
against them. Top level state officials are very involved in cybersecurity initiatives, having 
named cybersecurity as one of their top seven priorities on their strategic plan.  
Cybersecurity governance in the state covers the executive branch, but does not include 
K-12 or higher education. The authority for cybersecurity governance is codified and in statute. 
The statute states that the CISO’s office is responsible for providing the strategic direction and 
governance of the executive branch, but does not go too much further into how to work with the 
public and how to engage in public-private partnerships. Those areas are left to the 
administrators to fulfill, and are usually done via steering committees. These committees are 
comprised of nominated folks from different parts of the public and private sector. They provide 
review guidance for one angle specifically wide. For cybersecurity, the steering committee is the 
Information Privacy and Security Council, created because of Hawaii’s database navigation law. 
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Hawaii is trying to move to a more centralized cybersecurity model, however, the process is slow 
moving due to funding. 
Mississippi. The State of Mississippi employs the Mississippi Department of IT Services 
for their cybersecurity needs under the Enterprise Cybersecurity Program for state government. It 
serves two functions: one is a governance function; the other an operational function. Under 
governance, the office is responsible for developing an enterprise security policy – the minimum 
requirements that an agency should implement on the security of their assets and data that they 
own and support. The state operates under a hybrid approach, with a centralized network that all 
agencies connect to in the telecom division. The agencies have a lot of autonomy and make their 
decisions from a technology perspective. Legislation was created that started an enterprise 
security program that will write and implement minimum policy requirements and standards that 
agencies “should” implement. Agency heads are responsible for the security of their data and 
their resources. From a budgeting perspective, it is completely decentralized. Looking at the state 
as a whole, all the individual agencies – as far as state government is concerned – lack resources 
and people that are dedicated to implementing security. Mississippi’s representative says “there 
is also a lack of understanding and awareness at levels that you would need in order to provide 
the support to get the resources that you would need,” (CIS Interviews, 2019). There are a few 
agencies that have dedicated staff and they focus and do a decent job at implementing security. 
But, there is a wide array of agencies that do not have the resources to implement the hygiene 
layer of security that is needed.  
 As more and more agencies in Mississippi are moving to the Cloud, some decisions are 
being made at the enterprise level. Being a decentralized model, the Mississippi Department of 
IT Services does not have a very good view of the state’s posture. In order to know the posture 
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for state government, one would have to have an understanding of the security posture of each 
agency; that is not happening today. This limits the ability to address gaps or shortfalls that the 
agency might have. A positive attribute of the decentralized model is that potentially, agencies 
that have a presence and people dedicated to security can implement controls specific to their 
agency in a way that helps them be more secure and carry out their missions. The governor of 
Mississippi does not play a big role in cyber related issues, as most decisions go to a committee 
after the Mississippi Department of IT Services addresses it. Partnerships are very important 
though. The state does not work with local governments or K-12, as they are out of their 
purview.  
New Hampshire. Cybersecurity initiatives for the State of New Hampshire fall under the 
executive branch; there are outliers that are not included in the scope of their responsibilities: 
Secretary of State who is responsible for elections, and the judicial and legislative branches. The 
office of the CISO is responsible for the cybersecurity posture of the state, the cybersecurity 
policy, and the strategic direction. New Hampshire’s centralized governance is connected to the 
centralized management of resources. However, what makes it more hybrid or decentralized are 
the exceptions of operational support that they cannot provide to the agencies. There are certain 
cybersecurity capabilities not under direct control, operated by other parts of the department, and 
the CISO’s office provides guidance and direction to those organizations who have cyber 
relevant capabilities. New Hampshire’s greatest cybersecurity risk is malicious code coming 
through email; that is where they are seeing the biggest threats – phishing and malware. The 
threat that comes through email is wide and broad. 
Cybersecurity is part of IT governance in the state and all decisions that affect 
cybersecurity are made by the governance body. The cybersecurity budget is part of the overall 
95 
 
IT budget. Cybersecurity is not transcribed in law, though IT is. The main governance body, the 
IT Council is currently chaired by a member of the New Hampshire National Guard, and is 
represented by the top eight state agencies. There are two legislators on the Council and at least 
two members from the public and private sector. The mixed body is elected to three-year terms 
on the IT Council. New Hampshire also has a governance body called the Cybersecurity 
Advisory Committee (CAC) that was established by an executive order (not law) by the governor 
and has representatives from all agencies. This group can make recommendations and advice to 
the IT Council on policies, initiatives, or direction to take in an advisory role only. The 
cybersecurity leader from New Hampshire thinks the state’s approach to cybersecurity 
governance is a success, and recognizes that there is always room for improvement. It is an 
approach that is very dependent on having the right people and the right outreach. 
North Carolina. North Carolina’s Department of Enterprise Security Risk Management 
handles cybersecurity and cybersecurity governance in the state. The role of the department is to 
provide governance for the security program for the state, providing incident response and 
vulnerability assessment project reviews. These are core subjects found within a security 
program. The Department of Enterprise Security Risk Management has identified a lot of 
deficiencies within the state and in the counties. Funding is an issue for the state, as are 
resources. The department looks to support a statewide approach to cyber and is looking for 
ways to fund the smaller counties and municipalities. The interviewee hopes for a holistic 
cybersecurity governance approach in the state because state data does not just sit within the 
executive agencies. “If we’re not protecting them, we’re not protecting us,” (CIS Interviews, 
2019).  
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Legislatively, the office has a broad state reach and has control and governance of the 
executive branch agencies. The state is mainly decentralized; however, parts are consolidated. 
The office has been legislatively mandated and there are participating agencies that have been 
consolidated within. However, some portions of these executive branch agencies have been able 
to receive exceptions. The State of North Carolina’s cybersecurity programs have accountability 
assigned and measured/assessed through statutes that speak to the need annually for assessments 
to be conducted by the agencies; that report is provided to the legislative oversight committee on 
an annual basis. They leverage that to create the continuous monitoring program on a three-year 
cycle, taking a data centric approach to cyber. The Department of Enterprise Security Risk 
Management has oversight of state data in the state agencies. They also have approval authority 
of where the data can sit and how it will be protected while it is there.  
Cybersecurity governance in the State of North Carolina covers the budget and includes 
policy and technical standards and personnel. The office generates the statewide cybersecurity 
policy and is in the process of deploying enterprise scanning; from a vulnerability assessment 
perspective the office has broad control of enterprise monitoring. The policies and the 
implementation of policies are applied to the continuous monitoring plan that the state has in 
place. They are an extension of the security policies and are direct indicators of whether or not 
the state is meeting the right standard and meeting the intent of the security policies. The 
Department of Enterprise Security Risk Management office also manages cyber awareness 
training. The state does not have a cybersecurity committee or a governing body outside of the 
office; this could be beneficial as it would pull in various elements that are not being taken into 
consideration at the time being. The state would like to have representatives from academia, the 
private sector, and state and local government in a consolidated group to help make decisions for 
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a whole-of-state approach. The decentralized model in place is not seen as a strength. The State 
of North Carolina cybersecurity governance initiative has the support of the governor and 
legislature; however, funding is stopping them from moving to a more centralized approach.  
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Executive Summary 
Cybersecurity threats are an ever-present organizational risk on par with economic, legal, 
operational, financial, and political risks. They increasingly affect state assets. Managing these 
risks, and the threats from which they stem, must be part of a state’s overall risk management 
portfolio. To do this, state leaders must have effective cybersecurity governance.  
Cybersecurity governance is the processes by which 
decisions are made about cybersecurity risk. Effective 
cybersecurity governance provides the mix of control 
and influence necessary and appropriate for a state, 
and includes mechanisms for mitigating and 
responding to risk. 
While every state has implemented cybersecurity 
programs, few have cybersecurity governance that 
effectively ensures that a state’s risk is managed to a 
level and in ways that have been determined to be, 
through formalized governance processes, acceptable 
to the governor and legislature. An effective 
cybersecurity governance framework answers important questions such as: 
 
1. What decisions need to be made about cybersecurity threats? 
2. Who makes those decisions? 
3. How are those decisions made? 
4. What mechanisms exist to inform those decisions? 
5. Who has responsibility for translating decisions made by cybersecurity governance into 
effective cybersecurity programs? 
6. What processes exist to make sure that the cybersecurity programs are effective? 
 
This Call to Action presents four steps to be taken by governors and state legislatures to establish 
or strengthen their cybersecurity governance: 
1. Establish Authorities through Executive Order and Legislation 
2. Formalize Key Processes 
3. Assign Roles and Responsibilities 
4. Monitor Performance of Cybersecurity Governance Framework and Adapt as 
Necessary 
 
It also includes nine tools that states have found useful in strengthening their cybersecurity 
governance, as well as questions that governors and state legislatures can ask to help determine 
whether their cybersecurity governance is effective in addressing and minimizing the threats their 
states face. 
 
Managing Cyber Threats through 
Effective Governance 
A Call to Action 
 
This document is a Call to Action for 
governors and state legislatures to improve 
their cybersecurity risk management 
capabilities by creating or strengthening their 
cybersecurity governance. It presents four 
action steps and a set of tools to guide the 
decisions states must make and execute to 
respond to an ever-increasing and evolving 
threat to state assets and operations. 
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Once established, cybersecurity governance must be agile, allowing cybersecurity programs to 
evolve as new threats that require adaptations in risk management strategies emerge. As smaller 
organizations become increasingly aware of their limits in understanding threats and managing 
their risk, they are looking to state partners for assistance. Expanding scope beyond executive level 
agency assets, to a ‘whole of state’ perspective that engages stakeholders across multiple sectors 
and levels of government in a coordinated and collaborative process of risk management is 
increasingly recognized as an important step in managing a state’s cybersecurity risks. 
An Increasing Threat to State Assets 
Cyber threats pose an increasingly significant risk to state governments and to the services that the 
public depend on. The information technology infrastructure that states have grown to rely on over 
the past half century poses as much risk to their operations as the lead water pipes and rusting 
bridges that more visibly demand our attention. Managing these risks must be part of a state’s 
overall risk management portfolio. To do this, state leaders must have effective cybersecurity 
governance.  
 In some states, governance structures are defined through executive orders and administrative 
code. Other states use legislation to formally establish governance. Some states have found that 
while their governors and other top elected officials have attempted to increase cybersecurity 
capability and capacity, efforts have fallen short due to the lack of a formally established 
governance structure. Without an overarching governance structure, it is difficult to sustain 
coherent and consistent cybersecurity programs and practices.  
This document is a Call to Action for governors and state legislatures to strengthen their 
cybersecurity risk management capability through creating or strengthening their cybersecurity 
governance. It presents four recommended action steps and a set of tools to guide the decisions 
that must be made and executed if states are to be prepared to respond to ever-increasing and 
evolving threats to state assets.  
 
 
 
 
What is Cybersecurity Governance? 
The Frontier of Cybersecurity 
“The frontier of cybersecurity today is ensuring that time-tested, risk-based techniques for hardening systems, 
training users, and sharing information are implemented, sustained, and coordinated. Organizations accomplish 
these objectives through governance, the ‘formal and informal institutions that [influence how] a group of 
people determine what to decide, how to decide, and who shall decide’.”  
Garcia, Forscey, and Blute  
Beyond the Network: A Holistic Perspective on State Cybersecurity Governance  
96 NEB. L. REV. 252 (2017); https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol96/iss2/3 
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Cybersecurity governance is the processes by which 
decisions are made about cybersecurity risk, and 
effective programs that manage that risk to a degree that 
is acceptable to the governor and legislature. If done 
well, cybersecurity governance defines priorities, 
processes, metrics, tolerances, and implementation 
methods. It is codified in legislation and executive orders 
that provide a framework for written policies and 
procedures. It integrates with and reflects the structure 
of the state’s overall IT governance. And, most importantly, cybersecurity governance establishes 
a state-specific structure to be followed by the state’s cybersecurity operational teams when 
identifying, quantifying, and managing cybersecurity risks on a state-wide level. 
 
Every state has cybersecurity programs: offices, standards, guidebooks, procedures, and incident 
response plans that protect the state from cyber threats and enable it to respond quickly when that 
protection fails. Cybersecurity governance, on the other hand, is the framework that guides these 
programs and links them to the state’s risk management processes. Cybersecurity governance:  
 
• Consists of the executive level decision-making processes and the policies and procedures 
for overseeing the cybersecurity programs; 
• Provides the necessary control and influence a state’s elected leaders need to have over 
their state’s cybersecurity programs; 
• Establishes clear definitions and assigns roles and responsibilities; 
• Defines processes, tolerances, metrics, priorities, and implementation methods; and 
• Links the state’s cybersecurity programs into decision-making processes that enable the 
state’s elected leaders to understand and minimize the cybersecurity risks that their state 
faces.  
 
If done well, a cybersecurity governance framework answers important questions like: 
• What decisions need to be made about cybersecurity threats? 
• Who makes those decisions? 
• How are those decisions made? 
• What mechanisms exist to inform those decisions? 
• Who has responsibility for translating decisions made by cybersecurity governance into 
effective cybersecurity programs? 
• What processes exist to make sure that the cybersecurity programs are effective? 
 
Fighting with One Army 
… we’re fighting with five armies and 
we need to be fighting with one.. There 
has to be an army of one to be really 
effective in cybersecurity in the 
government. And that happens in 
governance. State Name 
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While every state has cybersecurity programs, not all states 
have effective cybersecurity governance that ensures the 
state’s risk is managed at an appropriate level and to a 
sufficient degree. As a governor and legislature, understanding 
the risk the state faces and the programs to mitigate those risks 
provides an impetus for improving the state’s cybersecurity. In 
today’s cyber risk environment – where essential services 
depend on technology working and where our cyber 
adversaries get smarter and more sophisticated every day – it 
is essential that states establish effective cyber governance so that they can adapt quickly and keep 
up with the increasing and changing threats to state assets. 
Agility: A Critical Cybersecurity Governance Design Priority 
As governors and state legislatures commit to taking action to manage their risk, they must also 
recognize that creating and strengthening cybersecurity governance requires a continuous process 
of understanding cyber threats and translating that knowledge into appropriate cybersecurity 
actions. A cyclic “risk-based” approach ensures that a state has the agility necessary to successfully 
evolve its cybersecurity risk management capability. Cybersecurity governance must be tailored 
to keep up with current risks and agile enough to adapt to future risks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Establishing Cybersecurity 
Governance within a Specific State Context 
State government leaders must manage risk within a context where power is distributed across 
sectors and levels and branches of government. Regardless of the structures and local culture that 
a governor and state legislature must operate within, they must establish cybersecurity governance 
that provides the mix of control and influence necessary and appropriate for their state, and that 
includes mechanisms for mitigating and responding to risk. 
 
Building Understanding of Threats, 
Vulnerabilities, Capabilities, and  
Potential Response Strategies 
Protecting State Assets  
Against Cyber Threats 
Creating and Strengthening  
Cybersecurity Governance 
  
Reducing Risk by Reducing 
Waivers 
One of the biggest threats I’ve seen 
to our cybersecurity programs is 
the granting of waivers. If we had 
effective cyber governance, waivers 
could be limited to very specific 
conditions. State Name 
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Most states have already established some form of cybersecurity governance. Some have the 
“centralized structure” recommended by many experts, essentially placing decision-making 
authority on cybersecurity in one or more central organizations and, in many cases, embedding 
cybersecurity governance within the state’s centralized information technology services 
organization. Others have a more decentralized approach to establishing the desired control and 
influence, while still others have implemented hybrid models with a mix of centralized and 
decentralized authorities, roles, and responsibilities.  
Many organizations, including the National Association 
of State Chief Information Officers, strongly recommend 
a centralized approach to cybersecurity governance1. 
While full centralization may be out of reach for many 
states given their current culture and structures, evolving 
away from fully decentralized toward centralization is 
highly recommended. Ultimately, of course, day-to-day 
responsibility for managing cyber risk falls to the 
governor, like it does for all of the state’s risks. 
Regardless of where a state starts with cyber governance, 
what is in place must support a tolerance for risk that reflects the intentions of the governor and 
legislature. It must put in place policies and processes that enable the elected officials to understand 
the state’s risks and act effectively to manage those risks. 
Four Actions Steps for Governors and State Legislatures 
When establishing cybersecurity governance, whether through executive order, legislation, or 
administrative code, governors and state legislatures must ensure that their cybersecurity 
governance has the elements necessary to effectively manage their risks. The governance structure 
must designate specific units with both responsibility for cybersecurity and the authority to carry 
out those responsibilities. It must spell out how authority should be exercised and where 
collaboration with other stakeholders should take place in preparing for and responding to 
cybersecurity threats. 
 
Four action steps are being used across the United States by governors and state legislatures as 
they work to establish cybersecurity governance (See also Appendix A): 
 
1. Establish Authorities through Executive Order and Legislation. Executive 
orders and legislation are being used by governors to formally establish the entities 
and authorities required to govern cybersecurity. Such authorities are being designed 
to overcome existing fragmentation in cyber governance and, where possible, are 
leveraging strong existing governance structures.  
 
1 Put a link to NASCIO document regarding centralization here.  
Cybersecurity Governance Approaches 
Centralized. Authority and decision-
making vested within a central body. 
Decentralized. Authority and decision-
making distributed to individual 
organizations. 
Hybrid. Authority and decision-making 
distributed between a central body and 
individual sub-organizations. 
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2. Formalize Key Processes. An effective governance framework formalizes key 
processes, including financial, procurement, technical standards, and risk 
assessment, necessary to effectively identify and manage cyber risks. 
3. Assign Roles and Responsibilities. An effective governance framework includes 
an assignment of roles and responsibilities for designing and implementing the 
state’s cybersecurity program as directed by the governor and/or legislature. 
4. Monitor Performance of Cybersecurity Programs and Adapt as Necessary. An 
effective cybersecurity governance framework has performance metrics for the 
state’s cyber risk management. It requires performance metrics for cybersecurity 
operations, but does not establish them. 
 
Tools for Cybersecurity Governance  
Nine tools are being used by states to execute the authorities established in their governance 
frameworks (See Appendix B for the detailed list of tools).  
 
1. Enterprise Architecture 
2. Cyber Risk Assessments 
3. Control over IT Procurement and Acquisition 
4. Control over Network Connectivity 
5. Councils and Advisory Boards 
6. Complementary Legislation 
7. Collaboration and Shared Services Agreements 
8. Monitor Workforce Requirements and Close Gaps 
 
These tools are critical to states’ efforts to gain compliance, even within executive agencies, with 
the standard policies and procedures required to systematically manage risk. Critical to the success 
of cybersecurity governance, and to the use of these tools, is the existence of some level of effective 
information technology governance. Governance tools such as the use of formal risk assessments 
and standards are more well-known and used. Where there is a recognized need for organizations 
to work together and authority to compel participation is limited or missing, other tools, such as 
agreements and collaborations are necessary. These tools are critical for addressing the often weak 
Tool Example: Control over Network Connectivity  
 
State Name. We’re our own service provider, and we also serve as a service provider to the other elected 
constitutional offices. And, so that gives us the ability to funnel network traffic through a shared set of appliances 
that we manage and maintain and provide to them.  
State Name. We've got network connectivity into all seven constitutional branches of government. So, we have 
visibility into everything at a network level across the whole state. That provides us a leg up in that we have the 
ability to capture, protect, and look at the information coming across at a network layer to make sure that we 
are being protected. 
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or missing authority that executive agencies have to establish the interagency, intergovernmental, 
and inter-sectoral agreements that are necessary to formalize collaborations.  
 
Expanding Scope: Building a Whole of State Risk Management Program 
This document provides a recommended set of actions for governors and state legislatures to take 
today in creating and strengthening their cybersecurity governance. The need for cybersecurity 
governance isn’t static; strategies must evolve if states are going to effectively protect state 
government assets. States must improve their governance to ensure that they are ready to adapt as 
new threats emerge and require new risk management strategies.  
Increasingly, states’ success will correlate with the extent to which they are able to expand the 
scope of their cybersecurity governance across all of the state’s public and private critical 
infrastructures. This implies incremental expansion from executive level agency assets to a ‘whole 
of state’ perspective that engages stakeholders across all 
sectors in a collaborative process of risk management.  
As smaller organizations become increasingly aware of the 
limits to their ability to locally manage risk, expansion will 
become increasingly acceptable and expected. This may be 
reflected in governance that evolves from predictable and 
stable funding to funding that is commensurate with the 
state’s position with respect to actual measured risk.  
In some states, such adaptation may mean expanding authority from solely controlling network 
connections to controlling IT procurement. In other states, it may mean expanding the scope of 
authority beyond state government2 or building collaborations that lead to joint agreements about 
how cybersecurity threats will be managed across levels of government and into key sectors 
including local government. In many cases, it will lead to both. What is critical, regardless of the 
maturity of any single state’s cybersecurity governance, is an ongoing commitment to governance 
 
2 https://www.nascio.org/resource-center/resources/stronger-together-state-and-local-cybersecurity-collaboration/ 
Expanding Scope 
State Name. The state education department in STATE NAME, for example, is required by law to establish 
minimum standards for security and privacy of student data. This is being accomplished through a collaboration 
between the state education department staff and the state CISO.  
State Name. School districts are required by law to follow a cyber-framework and are required to report incidents 
to the state education department. 
State Name. A senate bill set forth the ability to align cybersecurity strategy across all seven branches of 
government in STATE NAME. 
 
 
Ready for Next Order Problems 
Because of the things [we’ve done] like 
being centralized, having staff, having 
budget, we’ve been able to start 
focusing on those next order problems. 
Like, what do you do to protect and help 
the locals? How do you partner with 
industry? State Name 
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that is adaptable and responsive. A commitment to governance ensures that states, and not just 
state governments, are ready as threats evolve. 
  
Critical Success Factors for Effective Cybersecurity Governance: Willing Participants, Champions, 
Moral Responsibility, Collective Approach, Data Driven, and Forward Thinking 
You have to find those willing participants, and you have to find that champion that can effectively 
message the ultimate effects of a cyber-attack. We have a moral responsibility to protect the citizens 
of our state, so it's going to take a collective approach to protecting the infrastructure, the people, the 
data, and everything that goes with it on a day-to-day basis. You need to first and foremost 
understand what your current state is in order to determine what you need to do for the future. 
State Name 
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APPENDIX A: Managing Cyber Threats through Effective Governance 
A Call to Action for Governors and State Legislatures 
Four Action Steps 
 
# Action Action Description 
 
 
1 
 
 
Establish 
Authorities 
 
Issue executive orders and enact legislation to formally establish the entities and 
authorities required to govern cybersecurity in your state.  
a. Leverage the strengths of existing governance structures. 
b. Design authorities to overcome fragmentation in cybersecurity governance and 
programs within the state. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Formalize 
Key 
Processes 
 
• Ensure the governance framework includes formalization of key processes 
necessary to manage risk.  
• This can take the form of the definition, ongoing review, and implementation 
of processes designed to effectively identify and manage cyber risks (financial, 
procurement, technical standards, risk assessment processes) including 
responding to questions such as: 
o How are cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and risks determined? 
o What level of cyber risk is acceptable to our governor and state 
legislature? 
o Who determines what controls to put in place to mitigate risk to an 
acceptable level? 
o How will controls be monitored on an ongoing basis and revised to 
respond to changing conditions? 
• Of particular importance are the processes required for ensuring predictable 
and stable funding to those charged with the ongoing responsibility for 
cybersecurity governance and those authorized through that governance to 
assess cybersecurity threats, design and execute responses, develop technical 
architectures/standards, and help to conceive and implement required 
processes.  
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Assign Roles 
and 
• Ensure the governance framework includes processes for assigning the roles 
and responsibilities each of the state’s units will take in designing and 
implementing the state’s cybersecurity program.  
o This includes state government program units, its IT units and any 
dedicated cybersecurity units, and external entities including the Multi-
State Information Sharing and Analysis Center® (MS-ISAC®) and federal 
and private sector cybersecurity units. 
 110 
 
Responsibili
ties 
 
• Ensure the governance framework includes processes for assigning the roles 
and responsibilities each of the state’s units will take in establishing and 
managing collaborative approaches to cybersecurity.  
 
 
4 
 
Monitor 
Performanc
e and Adapt 
as Necessary 
• Ensure your state’s cybersecurity governance requires the use of robust and 
relevant indicators in decision-making and establish policies and procedures 
for guiding their management and use.  
• Ensure cybersecurity governance requires the creation and ongoing review of 
robust and relevant indicators that go beyond the reporting of incidents and 
that guide cybersecurity governance strategy and execution.  
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APPENDIX B: Managing Cyber Threats through Effective Governance 
 
A Call to Action for Governors and State Legislatures 
 
Nine Cybersecurity Governance Tools 
# Tool Tool Description 
 
1 
 
Enterprise 
Architecture  
An Enterprise Architecture (EA) is a critical tool for establishing technical 
standards for an enterprise. It defines a set of agreed upon standards and provides 
a touchstone for all technical investments. It is also a critical tool for modeling the 
potential negative consequences of investments that fall outside of the established 
standards.  
 
2 
 
Cyber Risk 
Assessments 
Many states require cyber risk assessments as part of regular reporting cycles, 
procurement decisions, and connecting to various networks. Such assessments 
create visibility of risks and reinforce adoption of security best practices and 
products. They make it possible for information about the threat potential related 
to any one action or group of actions to be available for use in decision-making.  
 
 
3 
 
Control over 
IT 
Procurement 
and 
Acquisitions 
Many states place the Chief Information Officer and/or the Chief Information 
Security Officer (CIO and CISO) on the critical path to IT procurement. Authority 
over IT procurement in executive agencies makes it possible for these officials to 
require that IT procurements meet state security standards and that selected 
procurements include an assessment of cyber risk. Establishing this level of 
authority over IT procurement in non-executive agencies is a long-term goal of 
cybersecurity governance bodies in many states.  
 
 
5 
 
 
Control over 
Network 
Connectivity 
Some states are able to manage risk because they have authority to control what 
connects to their networks. In these states, CIOs and CISOs have been granted 
authority to require those seeking to connect to state networks to comply with the 
rules as established through governance processes. This authority provides the CIO 
and CISO indirect authority over IT procurement (i.e., if the item you want to 
purchase doesn’t meet our standards, we can’t stop you from buying it, but you 
may not connect it to the state’s network).  
 
6 
 Many states are using Governance Councils and Advisory Boards as vehicles to 
execute cybersecurity governance put forward in executive orders and legislation. 
These bodies are often used to interpret executive orders and legislation, establish 
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Councils and 
Advisory 
Boards 
operational policies and procedures for cybersecurity programs, and to monitor 
their performance.  
7 Complement
ary 
Legislation  
Some states are passing laws that complement existing cybersecurity governance 
legislation to focus on specific priority domains, such as school districts and 
student data.  
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
Collaboratio
n and Shared 
Services 
Agreements 
Interagency. Many state CIOs and CISOs only have authority over executive 
agencies under the control of the governor, and not those of separately elected 
officials. Interagency agreements, including joint decision-making bodies, are 
being used in many states to bridge these gaps to create coherent government-wide 
cybersecurity programs at the state level.  
Intergovernmental. In most states, the state CIO and CISO have no authority 
over local government cybersecurity. However, a few states are moving to 
formalize authority and responsibilities for non-state government assets from a 
cybersecurity perspective. Many states are investing in the development of 
intergovernmental agreements and other collaboration tools focused on 
cybersecurity and, in particular, joint governance and shared operational 
capability. For instance, some states have highly centralized elections operations 
where the state, often through a state board of elections, directs procurements and 
standards for local election systems.  
 
 
9 
 
 
Monitor 
Workforce 
Requirement
s and Close 
Gaps 
 
Many states are struggling to fill cybersecurity positions. One strategy for filling 
those positions and providing the continuous training required to stay current is to 
ensure your state’s cybersecurity governance has policies and procedures for 
regularly identifying necessary cybersecurity skills and making provisions for 
buying and/or building those skills. These skills should include the ability to create 
and use indicators of program effectiveness, to perform risk assessments, and to 
effectively communicate risk to key stakeholders.  
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APPENDIX C: Managing Cyber Threats through Effective Governance 
 
A Call to Action for Governors and State Legislatures 
 
Recommended Cybersecurity Governance Indicators 
There are many metrics for assessing the adequacy of cybersecurity programs, but few for assessing 
cyber governance programs. A state’s cybersecurity governance is effective if it reduces the state’s 
risk. However, because there are few commonly-accepted metrics for measuring risk, measuring the 
effectiveness of governance is difficult. Furthermore, no states publish measurements of their cyber 
risk, so there are few benchmarks from other states for comparative purposes. 
 
Below we list some questions that governors and state legislatures should have answers to if their 
cybersecurity governance is effective in addressing and minimizing the threats their states face. 
 
Category # Cybersecurity Governance Indicator 
P
rep
a
red
n
ess 
1 Do we know what the three biggest cyber risks are to our state? What are we doing 
about them? 
2 Have we been told how we are protecting our state’s most important assets from the 
cyber threats they face? 
3 Do we know what the roles of the agency and the IT departments are for protecting 
each agency’s information assets? 
5 Do we get briefed on the annual Nationwide Cyber Security Review (NCSR)? 
6 Do we have an annual cyber risk assessment conducted by a reputable third party? 
7 Do we perform regular email phishing exercises for our employees? 
In
cid
en
t R
esp
o
n
se 
8 Do we have an annual tabletop exercise to test out our ability to respond quickly to a 
significant disruptive cyber incident? 
9 Do we know who is in charge when we have such an incident? 
1
0 
Do we have pre-prepared templates for communicating with our employees and the 
public if an incident occurs? 
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1
1 
What do we do if the incident is so severe that our resources can't handle it? What is 
our backup plan? If we are depending on cyber responders from other organizations, 
what if they are occupied dealing with their own incidents? 
1
2 
If the incident is accompanied by or causes kinetic effects and other physical 
disruptions, how are our emergency management and cyber responses going to work 
together? Have we done tabletop exercises to shake down how well our cyber 
processes integrate with our physical disruption processes? 
1
3 
Do we have an annual tabletop exercise with our agencies and IT units to test out our 
ability to recover from a cyber incident that causes significant and long-lasting 
disruptions to operations? 
O
v
era
ll 
14 Do we perform an annual review of the incidents we have experienced? What does it 
tell us, and how is it informing our state’s protective measures? 
15 Are the state’s Chief Risk Officer, the governor’s Homeland Security Advisor, and the 
Chief Information Officer synchronized? Do they all give the same answers to the 
above questions? 
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Appendix E: Permission from Employer to use Data 
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Appendix F: WCU IRB Approval Letter 
 
